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ABSTRACT
This thesis uncovers and analyzes the underlying causes of the inability
of a medium-sized industrial-based city to implement an economic
development strategy. The impasse in economic development stems from a
series of conflicts: within the community, between the community and the
city government, and between the city government and the county.
In order to analyze the impasse in economic development, this document
relies on a list of success factors found in the literature of Ross
Gittell. Gittell's static factors are supplemented with a more dynamic
analysis provided by the stage theory of community development, based on
the work of Mel King. The author adds her own concept of a social
movement to round out the analysis. The author uses interviews, planning
documents, and other secondary sources to provide historical and
background data.
Thesis Supervisor: Christopher Tilly
Title: Visiting Assistant Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
PREFACE
In the summer of 1990, I had the opportunity to work with several
activists and planners working in and for the city of Chester,
Pennsylvania. I was struck by the commitment of these people , as well as
their frustration. For some Chester is a city in desperate need of help.
For others, it is their home or former home. Although the people I met
were intelligent and dedicated, they felt overwhelmed with the expanse of
social and economic problems in Chester. "Where do we begin?" was a
question that I heard all too often.
This thesis is my attempt at answering this question. It does not provide
the definitive answer to Chester's problems -- but maybe a place to begin.
Through my six weeks of research, I learned much about Chester. However,
six weeks is a very short time to get to know a city. The people that I
interviewed (and many others that I was not able to speak with) have a
much more intimate knowledge than I. Given the limits of my knowledge, I
submit a critical review of what I believe are some of the underlying
problems in Chester. Some may find my criticisms too harsh; other's may
think my analysis is not fully informed. In any event, it is a thorough
analysis given the time period I had to read, research, and think about
what I and others had discovered.
My hope is that this document sparks debate as well as discussion. I also
hope that what I've written causes activists, planners, citizens, and
others who are important to Chester's revitalization to rethink their
approach to Chester's problems with an understanding of how their actions
are viewed in the eyes of others, especially the poor and disenfranchised
of Chester, for whom we profess to be working.
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INTRODUCTION
Economic development in the city of Chester, Pennsylvania is in a state of
impasse. Chester is currently marred by physical deterioration along its
waterfront, a notorious reputation for political corruption, citizen
apathy, and several failed attempts at community-supported revitalization
strategies.
However, in the early part of this century, Chester's economic base --
manufacturing -- was growing and the city's economy thrived along with it.
Shipbuilding, iron works, textile mills and oil production comprised the
heavy manufacturing base. Chester's growth as a commercial and industrial
center mirrors its population growth, which reached its apex in 1920 and
remained relatively stable throughout the 1950's. The most prosperous
periods in Chester's economic history were during the two World Wars, when
Chester produced much of the artillery for the military. 1
Since the 1960's, Chester's economy has been on a steady decline. Much
of Chester's economic deterioration is easy to explain. The decline in
Chester's manufacturing industries lowered employment. Lower prospects
for employment caused a decline in population. Population decline
resulted in lower sales for commercial establishments, lowering employment
even further. What the economic conditions do not fully explain is much
of the recent investment in the surrounding counties and the simultaneous
decline in Chester.
With so much available industrial land in Chester, why were smaller
industrial parks developed elsewhere in the county? With the level of
sophistication and experience within county economic development agencies,
why does Chester, which contains over 9% of the county's population,
continue to lag behind the county in investment? Between 1982 and 1987
the number of business in Delaware County rose 32.4% while the number of
businesses in Chester declined by 9%. Even within selected business
types, we find Delaware county growing and Chester declining. For example
between 1982 and 1987 the number of hotels in Delaware county grew by
10.3%, in Chester they declined by 50% (from 2 hotels to 1). In
recreation the number of establishments in Delaware County grew by 67.9%,
in Chester they declined by 50%. Health services increased in Delaware
county by 20% and decreased in Chester by 16.7%. This thesis attempts
to answer this question of uneven investment among others.
cited in Urban Revitalization Plan; East Side Caucus; Chester, PA; 1986;
p7
Although Chester's employment base (manufacturing in heavy industry) and
population have been declining since World War Two; coupled with the fact
that the overall picture of investment has focused on the wealthier
burrows of Delaware County, there are several planners within the city and
Delaware County who believe that Chester's turnaround is inevitable. The
county, in particular, has not let the potential of Chester's location
(which is along the Delaware River, midway between Philadelphia and
Wilmington, Delaware, and at the nexus of three major highways) go
unnoticed. With differing levels of aggressiveness at different times
during the past decade, the county has sought to position itself to take
advantage of the speculative value of Chester's waterfront by sponsoring
development projects and seeking to control the direction of development
in the city.
Even with Chester lagging behind the rest of Delaware county, the apparent
potential in Chester's location and the desire by local citizens to
improve their plight , development (particularly community-based
development) is presently in a state of inertia. Community-based
organizations and their funders, disappointed by repeated failures and
overwhelmed by a plethora of social problems, have turned their energies
inward and concentrated their efforts on housing and social issues such as
education.
This thesis attempts to understand what has brought Chester to this
current state and to suggest what might be done to change the path of
economic and civic decline by breathing new life into economic development
efforts. It examines historical, political, and social influences that
have brought city, and community-based efforts to an impasse. It draws on
theories of economic development and community revitalization to provide
an explanation of the current dynamics and explain the underlying logic of
the perceptions and visions of key players.
THEORY
The thesis starts from the theoretical framework of Ross Gittell, and then
amplifies and extends that framework by drawing on the work of Mel King.
Finally, drawing on the case study from this thesis, the author adds to
these theories her own concept of a social movement.
Ross Gittell provides us with characteristics of mid-sized industrial
cities that have successfully implemented economic development strategies.
Using the Gittell characteristics provides a static analysis; an initial
first cut for understanding Chester's inability to implement an economic
development strategy. The Gittell characteristics are drawn from
Gittell's doctoral work which is based on two paired case studies of
medium sized industrial cities. The pairs share very similar economic
histories. Gittell uses economic base and shift share analysis to account
for the economic effects of each city's decline.
One of the cities in each pair successfully implemented an economic
development strategy. The other two were less successful. Based on these
comparisons, Gittell comes up with an extensive list of factors that
characterize cities that are successful at economic development. The
characteristics include strong local leadership, competent local
development agencies, some system of balancing or mediating between
various interest groups, an inclusive community vision to motivate the
citizenry, a history as well as social and political culture that are
conducive to development efforts. I will expand on these characteristics
in Chapter One.
What we will find in the case of Chester is that many of Chester's key
players believe that several of the Gittell characteristics are critical.
However, the Gittell factors tell only a small part of the story. Gittell
does not explain what may be behind the lack of factors in any city.
Furthermore, the Gittell factors do not address the imbalance of power
that exists between a city like Chester and a more powerful county
government (which is represented in this case by the Delaware County
Republican machine).
To address the issues surrounding power imbalances, community control
literature (as expressed in the work of Mel King and Marie Kennedy) and
the author's social movement concept are used to provide a more dynamic
analysis of the historical events, as well as the current actions,
policies, and perceptions that continue to contribute to an impasse in
economic development.
King provides a developmental model --- the stage theory of community
development, which illustrates the stages in a community's struggles
toward human, economic, and political development. Kennedy points out
tradeoffs that must be made when choosing a transformative model of
development that makes community control and social change a priority over
tangible development products. The social movement concept focuses on a
sense of momentum and continuity in protest, planning, and implementation
which is implied in King's stage theory but is not explicit.
What we shall see is that underlying the apparent lack of Gittell factors,
the historical analysis, and current perceptions of key players are a
series of conflicts that have prevented Chester from moving smoothly
through the King stages, leaving Chester's development at an impasse. We
shall see in the following chapters that the lack of an inclusive
community vision, the lack of leadership, and the lack of a competent
local development agency can be traced to a history of conflict between
the community and city versus the county, the community versus the county,
and the fragmentation of community based efforts to revitalize Chester.
DATA
With the exception of Anna Squarrel-Jenkin's analysis of leadership in
Chester's black community, there is very little academic literature on
Chester. Therefore historical and background data was compiled from a
number of additional sources. Documentary sources include various
planning documents, written transcripts from public hearing testimonies,
program evaluations and reports, organizational brochures, grant
applications, and newspaper articles.
Interviews with principles involved in projects and programs provided
additional historical background as well as their perspective on economic
development in Chester.
SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTERS
Chapter One reviews some of the recent academic discourse on community
revitalization. It places the work of Ross Gittell within the historical
debate regarding the relevance of analyzing economic development at the
local level. Gittell's dissertation is based on in-depth comparative case
studies of four medium-sized industrial cities. His conclusions suggest
certain characteristics of cities that successfully implement economic
development strategies.
An in-depth review of one of Gittell's four case studies, the Monongahela
(Mon) Valley, is included because of its many parallels to Chester. One
parallel in particular is the history of competition between the
localities and the county to control the direction of development. I have
chosen to highlight the Mon Valley case because in Gittell's analysis of
the case, he does not fully explore the impact of the imbalance of power
between the two levels of government --- illustrating a shortcoming in his
analysis. This paper will explain the ramifications of that imbalance of
power. To explore these ramifications, I will draw on community control
literature.
Community control literature contributes another dimension of
understanding to the Chester experience. This literature explores the
tension between the goal of empowerment through citizen control of
economic development versus the desire to quickly obtain tangible economic
benefits. The later option requires relinquishing a considerable amount
of control to a higher level of government. This tension is evident in
the Mon Valley case study and it is critical to the understanding of the
impasse of development in Chester.
Chapter Two, History of Political and Economic Development, studies the
development of an unbalanced power relationship between the city and the
county and how that imbalance has impacted and continues to impact
economic development in Chester. This chapter examines the lack of
accountability of elected officials to the citizenry, in particular the
black community. We will also look at the historical events that explain
the dearth in leadership within Chester's black community. Chapter Two
documents the current state of economic development and discusses the
absence of a social movement to guide local development efforts.
we will see in this chapter, that Delaware County's more powerful position
enables the county to isolate the city's political leadership, control the
direction of development from behind the scenes, and influence the
perception of the city to outside investors and funders. By doing these
things, the Delaware County Republican machine contributes to the impasse
in economic development.
Chapter Three, Key Players, reveals what local planners (broadly defined),
county development agencies, and regional funders believe are the most
critical factors limiting Chester's revitalization. This chapter also
discusses the visions these various actors have for a revitalized Chester.
In this chapter, I compare the picture that interviewees paint of Chester
with Gittell's characteristics of cities that are similar to Chester that
have successfully implemented economic development strategies. Given
Chester's history and background, I use community control literature and
what I call the social movement concept to fill in where Gittell's
analysis falls short of explaining interviewee perceptions and the reality
of Chester's impasse in economic development.
Chapter Four, Review, Analysis, Conclusions, and Recommendations, reviews
the findings of Chapters Two and Three in light of the theory and concepts
discussed in Chapter One, analyzes the state of impasse by focusing on the
issues of conflict presented in Chapters Two and Three, and offers
suggestions for how Chester might get beyond the current state of impasse.
CHAPTER ONE
RECENT ACADEMIC DISCOURSE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNITY
REVITALIZATION STRATEGIES
In the latter half of the 1980's, many progressive planners were up in
arms in response to City Limits, a liberal treatise on urban economic
development by Paul Peterson. In that book, Peterson described the forces
of the market and national policy as virtually omnipotent. From his
conclusions, one could infer that there was little that cities could do or
would do to shape their own economic destiny.
Scores of planners were quick to respond to Peterson's argument, noting
that factors political, social, institutional, and individual could not be
counted out in explaining the success of some cities to revitalize their
centers. Many also tried to extend this analysis to the neighborhood
level. Some of Peterson's critics were armed with sociological, political
science, and organizational theory. Others put forth case studies as an
arsenal against Peterson's seemingly presbyopic2 view of the decline and
subsequent rebirth of some cities.
Whereas Peterson focuses on the limits of local action within the context
of national economic trends and federal policy, Lisa Peattie (1980) points
out that planning which is directed towards social change must be
understood at the local, neighborhood, institutional, or individual level.
"implementation [of plans] is embedded in political social
processes and deals with, if it does not actually collude
with, important vested interests. Thus the practice of [a
progressive, change oriented] approach will tend to be kept to
the lower level of things, outside the central planning,
national development strategy level."
In Space for Progressive Local Policy (1989), Clavel and Kleiwenski
document an increase and variety of progressive local policy since the
1970's. Clavel and Kleiwenski attribute the spread of local policy to
increased national and international networking. What Peterson's argument
seems to have missed, Clavel and Kleiwenski seem to suggest, is the
potential for cumulative effects of local action on the national economy
and national public policy.
Peter Doeringer et al take up the argument with Peterson on his own turf,
that of the profit-maximizing firm. In Invisible Factors of Development
(1987), Doeringer points out the role of management and innovation in
2 not able to see close up; opposite of myopic
determining regional and national growth. More importantly, Doeringer
argued that government can play a role in influencing growth by giving
firms incentives to implement progressive management policies and
incentives to promote innovation.
Ross Gittell picks up on the work of Doeringer and systematically examines
the factors influencing revitalization. Gittell accounts for economic
effects by using measurements such as economic base and shift share
components.3 In addition to economic factors, Gittell examines individual
leadership and the capacity of local development agencies.
USING GITTELL AS AN INITIAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
I have used the doctoral work of Ross Gittell as the initial organizing
framework for the analysis of Chester institutions and actors in its
revitalization process. Gittell's dissertation is based on paired case
studies of medium-sized industrial cities. One city in each pair
successfully implemented an economic development strategy. The other city
was less successful. From these comparisons, Gittell makes conclusions
about which factors are characteristic of cities that successfully
implement economic development strategies.
Gittell's conclusions are not tightly woven into a theoretical model, nor
does he point out which factors are most crucial to success. This makes
the factors difficult to summarize, but I will attempt to categorize them
as they are relevant to the analysis in the remainder of this document.
According to Gittell's studies, medium-sized industrial towns are
successful at initiating revitalization strategies if they have the
following:
strong local leadership
the ability to motivate the local citizenry and the ability to
influence and get resources from higher levels of government
and other regionally based sources (such as large foundations)
competent local development agencies
the ability to identify and address problems and opportunities
in local development. This includes analytical capacity to
identify economic c trends and the ability to package
financial deals
some system of balancing or mediating between various interest
groups
This can take on a variety of organizational forms, such as
public/private partnerships or convening institutions that
3 For a fuller discussion of these economic factors and their impact on
revitalization, see Gittell's unpublished thesis, A Critical Analysis of Local
Initiatives, Harvard University, 1989
balance or simultaneously address elite (or private business)
as well as non-elite concerns; alternatively, the simple
existence of well organized institutions that represent both
elite and non-elite concerns
a vision to motivate the citizenry to believe in the
possibility of the community's revitalization
Such a vision must be a broad-based conception of economic
development including issues such as housing, education, and
health care. This vision should generate a positive community
psychology, where citizenry believe that revitalization is
possible
the community's history, and its political and social culture
community psychology, which is shaped by past experiences, is
an important determinant of development capacity. For
example, past urban renewal programs can be responsible for
creating a sense of hope and a desire among citizens to want
to improve continue to improve their community or it can lead
to bitter disappointment, leaving citizens distrustful of
large scale government-sponsored programs.
What we find in the case of Chester is that even though Chester's key
players believe that several of the Gittell characteristics are critical
to Chester's revitalization, many of the Gittell factors are non-existent.
However, the Gittell factors only tell a small part of the story.
Gittell's list does not tell why the factors do not exist in Chester.
Furthermore, Gittell's factors do not address the imbalance of power that
exists between Chester and the Delaware County Republican machine.
Without understanding why this imbalance exists, we might be led to
believe that the simple addition of several Gittell factors is all that is
necessary for development. An in-depth understanding of the historical,
political and social factors reveals the more fundamental changes that are
necessary. In fact, one of Gittell's own case studies, the Monongahela
Valley, points to a similar need for fundamental political change as a
precondition for development.
The Mon Valley Case Study
The Monongahela (Mon) Valley case study is instructive because of its
similarities with the Chester experience. The case focuses on
revitalization efforts in eight communities in the lower half of the
valley. They are located within a 10 mile stretch of the Monongahela
River. By the mid 1980's these communities experienced extensive economic
dislocation and an accompanying decline in population due to the decline
in the steel industry. (Gittell 1988)
Like Chester, the Mon Valley communities are located in a politically
powerful county with proven experience in economic development. Allegheny
County has been the conduit for economic development funds since the early
1950's.4  The county's newest development entity, the Mon Valley
Commission, like the Delaware County Economic Development Oversight Board
and its member agencies, does not have strong representation or influence
from local officials.
The answer to the imbalance of power in this case was the establishment of
the Mon Valley Development Team. This development team was funded by the
Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC). Its purpose was to
circumvent an ineffective local government as well as to facilitate the
creation of locally-based organizational human capacity in the Valley.
Goals of MVDT were to mobilize friendly public and private resources, use
organizers to identify local leadership and assist local communities in
organizing CDC's, development project ideas and implement them.5
At the writing of the case study it was too early to make definitive
conclusions on the success of MVDT. Even Gittell questioned MVDT's ability
to compete with the county for control of the direction of development in
the Valley.' However, MVDT's preliminary successes in engaging citizens
around development issues were hopeful.
The Mon Valley case illustrates that without an analysis of the power
dynamics between city and county, the success of prescriptions are
uncertain. This analysis is needed to reveal the tradeoffs and priorities
that must be made when embarking on a development strategy that is
intended not only to produce tangible economic benefits but to empower the
citizenry to control development in their communities. I will argue that
the Chester case calls for such an analysis.
STAGE DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATIVE THEORY HIGHLIGHTS THE TRADEOFFS
BETWEEN COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT AND TANGIBLE ECONOMIC BENEFITS
Gittell's analysis overlooks power imbalances, but there is another
development literature that focuses on this issue --- the stage theory of
community development and transformative theory which are exemplified in
4 Gittell, Ross; "Struggling to Survive; Efforts to Revitalize the
Monongahela Valley"; Center for Business & Government Community Revitalization
Project; Harvard University, 1988, p9
ibid, p 103
6 ibid; pp 109 - 111
the work of Mel King and Marie Kennedy. The King and Kennedy literatures
are particularly designed for poor and disenfranchised communities and
propose that community controled development is not only the preferred,
but the more appropriate vehicle for economic and human development in
these communities.
Mel King's Chain of Change (1981) provides the basis of the stage theory
of community development. This book draws on the struggles of Boston's
black community. Through their struggles, activists discovered that the
only way to insure equitable and empowering development is for the
community to control development decisions through control of the land.
King's theory of development is organized into 3 stages --- the service
stage, the organizing stage, and the institution-building stage. A
community is at the service stage when it has a negative self image and
it is dependent on outside missionary-like institutions. During the
organizing stage the community works together to make institutions more
responsive community needs. The accompanying psychology during this stage
is the recognition that community members are deserving of government and
social services. During this stage, the community begins to gain power
through their collective actions. Finally, the demand for access to
institutions leads the community to question the institutions, realizing
differences in values with the dominant institutions and beginning to
realize the necessity of creating indigenous institutions.
These three stages of development, as they are reflected in King's work,
are given momentum and coherence because they are driven by an underlying
social movement --- the movement for empowerment and self-determination.
The existence of an underlying social movement to guide development is
important to maintaining momentum. The movement links (or rationalizes)
political and development activities so that they complement and reinforce
each other.
The central role of a social movment points to a set of guidelines for
community development. From the general to the specific, all planning all
projects, all of our work as planners should be directed towards
furthering the goals of the community's movement, King and Kennedy argue.
The movement defines the vision and gives rationale to all parts of the
whole:
"We must develop a full-scale vision of where we want to be so
that every individual, every group, can see clearly how their
work fits into the whole and contributes to the full
resolution of the issues which are shaping our times.
Otherwise we will continue to work in fragmented cells, unable
to draw sustenance from each other and unable to see the
ultimate goals." (King 1981)
Economic development projects should embody the goals of the movement.
Here King (1981) gives an example:
"One of the outstanding features of the NECDC Concentrated
Economic Development Program was its insistence from the
beginning the programs be designed to lead to complete
community control."
The daily work that we do as planners within those institutions should
embody those goals as well:
"technical assistance should be framed in relationship to
people's movements in order to build those movements."
Gaining political influence is an integral part of the community's
development. Here King describes its importance and the role it played in
the intermediary organization stage:
"Whether in education, employment or housing, the Black
community became increasingly aware that no appreciable
changes could be made without gaining political power in the
city and the state." (pg 79)
The goals of economic development should never be separated from political
organization. In Boston, the black community incorporated the lessons
learned from the 1960s into the political platform of the Black United
Front in 1969. That platform lists "control of the land" and "control of
politics" as the first and second goals. (King 1981)
The stage theory of community development implies a certain chronology.
The community must be organized before institutions are built or projects
are embarked upon. Herein is the dilemma facing all distressed
communities that seek empowerment as one of their goals. It follows from
the stage theory that tangible economic development goals must at times be
subordinated to the organizing needs or human development needs of the
community. Marie Kennedy's observation (1980) illustrates the difficulty,
especially for planners, in subordinating tangible benefits to the
community's control over development decisions.
"As a planner, its hard for me to arrive at that point. I've
been trained to do products. We planners and organizers have
to get clear that community development isn't simply, or even
primarily about achieving so many products."
7 Kennedy, Marie; "Lessons from Community Planning in Boston"; presented at
the Socialist Scholars Conference; New York, NY; April 10, 1988
THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT CONCEPT
The social movement concept is a slightly different take on King's stage
theory of community development. It differs from King's theory in that it
focuses on a sense of momentum and a sense of continuity which I think is
implied in King's work but is not explicit. The concept borrows from
Gittell in that it places critical value on understanding a community's
history. After all, it is a community's history that determines the
presence or absence of a sense of continuity.
A social movement requires continuity between actions that activists
pursue to achieve a set of goals (or a vision). The concept does not
imply that all actions move forward to achieve the desired ends but that
the activists intend that those actions should be directed towards
achieving those ends. Therefore, there is a certain consciousness and
direction in protests, planning, institution building, and program
implementation. When those actions fail, actors reevaluate, re-plan and
strategize with the same level of consciousness and sense of purpose.
The analysis of Chester in this thesis combines the two sets of
literatures represented by Gittell on the one hand and King and Kennedy on
the other. The King and Kennedy literatures are supplemented by the
social movement concept. Gittell provides us with an initial set of
factors to look for in determining why Chester has been unsuccessful at
implementing an economic development strategy. King provides us with a
developmental model to compare with the historical events surrounding
Chester's attempts at community revitalization. Kennedy forces us to
consider the implications of choosing a path that prioritizes community
control and social change over tangible development products. The social
movement concept gives us a prescriptive way for evaluating activist
efforts in the context of larger political and economic forces, building
on the prescriptions offered by King and Kennedy.
Chester's historical development and the resulting political conditions
are placed at the center of the analysis. We shall see that the power
structure, as it is expressed in the political realm, affects the
structure and capacity of development agencies and contributes to the
vacuum in local leadership. Finally, the absence of a social movement
helps explain the nature of interaction of community-based planners with
the local government and the larger power structure of the county
political machine.
CHAPTER TWO
HISTORY OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The history of Chester's political and economic development begins my
analysis of local relationships between people, groups, and institutions.
By studying these local relationships, not only do we learn that national
trends are not sufficient to explain Chester's fate but we get at the
roots of the conflicts between the city and community versus the county,
the community versus the city, and the fragmentation of community-based
efforts at local economic development.
In this chapter, we will look at the history of a) Republican party
politics in Chester and the County, b) the county's role in Chester's
economic development, and c) the history of community based development.
Finally, we will find that the failure to resolve many of the recurrent
conflicts in this history derives from d) the historical development of
leadership roles in Chester's Black community.
The development of Republican party politics in Chester and the county is
at the source of conflict that existed and continues to exist between the
Chester community and city government versus the surrounding county. The
history of Republican Party politics in Chester is a case study in the
resistance of vested interests --- namely white Chesterites who moved out
of Chester and into the county, and the Republican power structure --- to
the influence of non-whites on the communal life, and the economic and
political realms of Chester.
The recent history of the county's role in Chester's economy shows us that
the county's efforts to control Chester politics and development from
behind the scenes have resulted in conflict with the local government.
The conflict is further complicated by Chester's reputation for
corruption, the resulting distrust among the citizenry, as well as the
county's lack of respect for the sovereignty of Chester's local
government.
The history of development by community-based organizations, activists (I
interchangeably refer to these two groups as "the community") and local
government reveals conflicts between the community versus local government
and its development agency. This conflict is rooted in the lack of
accountability that government officials feel to its citizens.
The history of black Chesterites in the economic, political, and social
spheres helps to explain the apparent dearth in leadership emanating from
the black community. The history of leadership development in black
Chester reveals the source of fragmentation among community-based efforts
as well as the source of conflict between the community and city
officials.
REPUBLICAN PARTY POLITICS: CHESTER AND THE COUNTY
The history of Republican Party politics in Chester and the county is a
case study in vested interests' successful effort to maintain control of
Chester politics and its economy throughout the changes caused by the
influx of blacks into the Chester economy and political arena. The effort
involved a change in the structure of political power which enabled white
Chesterites living outside the city to control political offices and the
Chester economy from outside the city limits.
The change in the structure of political power in Delaware county and
Chester's position within that power system begins with the exodus of
white citizens to the surrounding burroughs during the 1950's. In her PHD
dissertation, Anna Squarrel-Jenkins (1984) noted that "although whites
were moving out of Chester to the growing housing developments being built
for them around the city, they still lived nearby and (throughout that
decade] they continued to dominate the working segment of the economic
sectors of the city." (p 166)
This observation is supported by census data. In 1950, only 25% of the
workforce lived within the city limits. Between 1950 and 1960, 16,500
whites left Chester and 42,000 non-whites entered. By 1980, Chester
residents still made up only 39% of the workers in Chester firms. The
remaining 61% were commuters.'
During the 1950's, the population of the suburbs was growing at such a
rate that Delaware County political boss and Chester native John McClure
recognized that it was necessary to set up a "separate but complementary
and symbiotic [political] structure" [in the suburbs] .9
No one in Chester was more influential than John McClure. His political
career spanned over 75 years. In a Daily Times obituary, the much revered
8 RPM Systems, Local Economy Inventory for Chester; Emmaus, PA; 198 4 ;p16
9 from an interview with the late Arthur Early, a state representative from
Chester ; Squarrels-Jenkins (1984)
machine boss power was described thusly:
Chester was his stronghold --- his castle --- and the county
was his fief"
Ironically, because of the deliberate actions of John McClure, Chester
eventually began to lose its power and prestige within county politics.
A Daily Times retrospective of McClure's career mentions that in 1963,
after recently recovering from a long hospitalization, McClure sought to
reestablish his power with a newly found vigor and vengeance. In 1963,
he "launched an offensive aimed at destroying district leaders whose
combined power posed a threat to his control of the county ... McClure
ordered a reassignment of political [appointments] aimed at redistricting
certain leaders out of their political power". Among these leaders was
Joseph L. Eyre, mayor of Chester. 0  Since McClure's last stand, local
Chester politicians have not been able to hold power independently of the
county political machine.
As the white population moved out into the county, powerful institutions
that are important to economic development followed the populace. In the
1970's, the Chester Times moved to Media and became the Delaware County
Daily Times. Today, the County Chamber of Commerce has succeeded the
Chester Businessmen's Association as the preferred vehicle for networking
and community status for the remaining businesses in Chester.
Changes were not limited to the relocation of important institutions. In
January of 1976, Delaware County established a home rule charter. The
significance of home rule is that it confers considerable power and
responsibility on the home rule locality. Delaware County has many of the
same powers as a larger city, including a strong county council.
Even as employment waned and important institutions moved out to the
county, Chester remained and continues to remain important to county
politics. Chester contains a significant, concentrated percentage of the
county's population, giving it potential power in the state house. Also,
many business minded Delaware County residents believe that Chester
contains potential or at least surplus economic resources --- namely
cheap labor and land.
By the 1980's, the face of Chester's local government had changed. The
change however was in appearance only. New black political leaders,
10 Delaware County Daily Times, December 8, 1963
including current Mayor Willie Mae James Leake, are all Republicans.
However, suspicion still abounds" that Chester is still controlled by
former mayor, county party boss, and convicted felon Nick Nacrelli. What
the Republican party left in Chester was a legacy of patronage and
corruption.
The city's one development agency, the Chester Redevelopment Authority
(CRA) is all too susceptible to political influence by the mayor and city
council. The CRA, unlike many Redevelopment Authorities, is an
administrative arm of the city. All development decisions as well as
budget approvals for development projects must go through city council.
Questionable development decisions by the CRA were cited as early as 1978
in a Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) assessment report.
The county continues to control Chester politics from behind the scenes by
insuring that the city is run by Republican candidates. The Republican
machine rewards these candidates by insulating them from their
constituency but the party does not give them access to the larger
Republican power structure. The county needs to maintain control over the
city and at the same time it is embarrassed by its reputation for
corruption. This is reflected in the comments of the late Arthur Early,
state representative from Chester.
"Chester is like a festering sore on a prize cow's rump.
Whether you cut if off or try to treat it, you take a chance
on ruining the cow." (Squarrel-Jenkins 1984)
THE COUNTY' S ROLE IN CHESTER' S ECONOMY
In addition to controlling city politics, the county has also tried to
control the direction of development in Chester so that it would serve the
county's economic interests. As is the case in politics, the county's
relationship with the city is a complex one. The county's behavior
towards Chester within the context of economic development is an extension
of Early's festering sore analogy. Not desiring to cut political ties
with the city, and not willing to take responsibility for they city's
economic welfare, Delaware County has engaged in policies that combine
" Newspaper articles often mention that Mayor Leake was Nacrelli's former
secretary. Other local officials are also mentioned as being part of the Nacrelli
cabinet. These suspicions were also mentioned in my interview with James
Brunswick and substantiated by other interviewees who wished not to be
identified.
behind-the -scenes control and benign neglect."
In response to the ambivalent behavior of the county, the city reacted in
ways that are often hard to predict -- sometimes identifying with the
county proposals and at other times resisting them. Thus, for example,
the city followed of the county's policy to support the expansion of the
stratagic route, 291, but fought the county over the proposed trash to
steam plant. As we shall see in a later section, this enigmatic behavior
results from city officials' isolation from the Republican party power
structure on the one hand, and officials' lack of accountability to the
citizens of Chester on the other.
In the remainder of this section, we will examine the nature of the
county' s involvement in Chester's economy and the city's reactions to the
county's involvement in Chester's economy.
The county's involvement in Chester's economy over the past ten years has
been sporadic. The county's behavior is reflective of an non-reciprocal
relationship in which the county views Chester as an economic resource but
does not feel responsible for the city's welfare.
Inquiries into current economic development efforts in the city elicited
responses ranging from ridicule to flippancy from some representatives
from county institutions. But at the same time, many comments by county
economic development planners, as well as some city planners, suggested
that they view Chester as an economic resource. Most agreed that
Chester's location makes its turnaround inevitable. One revealing comment
by an unidentified interviewee was that "Chester's best selling asset was
its depression." In other words, the more Chester declined the more
attractive it would be to investors. He went on to predict that "Once the
land along 291 is all developed, Chester will be a hot property." You
won't be able to pick up a property this cheap for the taxes alone."
Chester's location as a transportation nexus is important to county and
regional growth. In Chester, three major highways meet near the proposed
exit ramp off of Route 291. Much commercial and industrial development is
12 Chester interviewees noted exeptions in the work of the Delaware County
Community Action Agency and the social programs of the county Chamber of Commerce
" Route 291 is along the waterfront where a lot of redevelopment is being
planned throughout the county
anticipated along these highways. Chester is close to the Philadelphia
Metropolitan Airport and it is also one of the few areas in Delaware
County were industrial land is still available. Since 1981, the County
Chamber of Commerce, in cooperation with the county planning department
and the regional planning commission, pushed the development of Route 291
and continues to support those objectives."
The county's current tax policies affect investment in Chester.
Investment in housing may be significantly retarded because real estate
taxes are considerably higher, relative to elsewhere in the county.
County property tax assessments in Chester are not proportional to housing
values. A person who owns a $20,000 house in Chester will pay up to twice
the tax rate of the owner of a $100,000 house in the more affluent
burroughs. High taxes are a deterrent to homeownership for lower and
middle income people in Chester. This problem must be addressed at the
county level, but county officials have not been receptive to this policy
because such a change would result in a relative tax rate increase for the
homeowners of more expensive housing elsewhere in the county."
The city shares the county's view, in principle, that Chester's turnaround
is inevitable and have supported policies to expand industrial
development. Because the city also benefits from the inflated tax policy
by getting much needed revenues, it is also resistant to changing the tax
structure in Chester. However, Chester officials resent the county not
taking a more proactive and cooperative role in Chester's development.
Willie Mae Wells, executive director of Chester's Redevelopment Authority
said, "The county can no longer treat us like a stepchild. We are part of
the county and it must begin to address some of our concerns."
The county has used Chester's low income population as a resource for
county economic development, allowing the county to qualify for state and
federal funds. However, a 1977 assessment of CDBG programs questioned
whether county boroughs' use of CDBG funds was legitimate, and noted that
"it cannot be denied that the record [of the county] to date demonstrates
an unwillingness to tackle projects directly eliminating blight or serving
"1 Based on conversation with Chris Franklin of the County Chamber of
Commerce and testimony of the county council to the PA Dept of Transportation,
Jan 31, 1991
"5 Chester Community Improvement Project; "Chester Assessment Project";1989
the immediate needs of the low/moderate income groups. "1
From the county's vantage point, countywide and regional goals of growth
have often taken precedent over the development of human capital and local
Chester businesses. In no instance is this more apparent than in the
competition over two development projects in the mid 1980's. The
acquisition and development of the Riverbridge site allowed the county to
gain technical expertise in economic development as well as to control a
sizable piece of land in Chester. In the second project, a trash to steam
plant, struggles between the county and city over Chester's economic
development came to a head.
Riverbridge
The acquisition and development of the Riverbridge site allowed county
development agencies to cut their teeth on economic development. The
county acquired the site from the city of Chester in the early eighties,
after the city's several failed attempts at developing the site.
Shortly after the county's purchase, an Austrian roofing company expressed
an interest in acquiring some property for development of a plant in
Chester, less than a mile away from the Riverbridge site. The negotiation
process between the city and the Austrian investor was long and drawn out;
as the city attempted to extract improvements for sites adjacent to the
property from the Roofing company. These improvements were far in excess
of any potential impact that the new development would have on the
adjacent properties. Just when the Austrian entrepreneur was about to
consider another site, Delaware County's economic development specialist
suggested the Riverbridge site." The county and the Austrian company
worked out an agreement, shuttng out the city. This Austrian company, Tar
Mac Roofing, (now an English company) has developed a new roofing
technology and is expanding in several international markets.
The Riverbridge site currently houses, in addition to Tar Mac roofing,
four large tenants and several smaller tenants and there is still
developable land on the site. The county is currently debating whether
to invest in the dilapidated pier adjacent to the site. Since the
16 Community Development Block Grant Program: An Analysis of its Impact in
Delaware County; published by the Health and Welfare Council, Inc., Delaware
County Area Office; 1977; p36
" interview with Al Hilbert, Manager of the Riverbridge Site
Riverbridge acquisition, the county's Industrial Development Corporation
(IDC) has gone on to successfully develop other sites elsewhere in the
county. Although IDC is currently losing money on the project they own a
sizable piece of industrial land within city limits. The acquisition of
the Riverbridge site set the stage for a far more dramatic encounter
between the city and the county --- the battle over the trash to steam
plant.
Trash to Steam Plant
From its beginning, the trash to steam project was an uphill battle for
the city. In the mid-1980's, the city wanted to condemn waterfront
property owned by the politically influential Pennsylvania Electric
Company (PECO)1' in order to site a waste resource facility. The city
eventually lost its battle with PECO and on June 25th 1987, Mayor Leake
announced a new site the trash to steam plant. City officials rested
their hopes on an agreement with the city of Philadelphia to burn 1000
daily tons of Philadelphia trash.
Shortly after after losing their battle with PECO and moving the proposed
site, the city was busy complying with investigations over city bidding
practices for the demolition of the new site, and defending itself against
allegations from the county courthouse over the legality of the issuance
of bonds for the plant by a Wall Street financial house. County
officials publicly denounced this ill-fated venture in the County Times
which further humiliated Mayor Leake.
Day after day, the Times' articles criticized Leake's no-bid contracting
practices which resulted in her choice of a local black contractor to
demolish the new site, her choice of a former aide to head the newly
created Waste Resource Authority, and the investigations of the Wall
Street financial firm which handled the industrial development bonds for
the facility. Leake's weariness at battling the county was beginning to
show in a statement she made to a Daily Times reporter on June 23, 1987:
"It's almost [as ] if they're preying on a city like Chester
which so badly needs a break"
While the city's competence and ethics in carrying out the project are
questionable, it is difficult to argue that the tactics the county used in
1* PECO is represented on the board of the county Chamber of Commerce and
is currently working in cooperation with the Economic Development Oversight Board
to recruit companies for sites along the proposed expansion of Route 291.
securing its own trash to steam venture on the Riverbridge site were any
less underhanded. On June 27, 1987 the County Times announced a joint
venture between Westinghouse and Delaware County. Because the
announcement was such a short time after Leake's announcement to move the
site, the negotiations must have been taking place well in advance of the
announcement. The venture team offered a proposal to accept 1000 tons
daily of Philadelphia's trash, trash that had been agreed that would go to
the Chester plant. The Philadelphia trash was crucial to the financial
and economic feasibility of the Chester plant. Leake's reaction to the
announcement was one of shock and anger.
An advertising battle for the two projects ensued over the next several
weeks in the county paper. The Westinghouse ad claimed that Chester would
receive millions of dollars in host community fees from the
Westinghouse/Delaware County Plant. County officials were quoted as
saying that Chester would be crazy not to take this offer. In response,
Leake argued that the Delaware County plant would not be as beneficial for
Chester residents as a Chester owned plant.
Currently the Westinghouse plant is proceeding according to schedule. The
city argues that their plant is more environmentally sound. Nevertheless,
the bond money for the project is practically gone. Furthermore, the city
of Philadelphia has reneged on its commitment to supplying tonnage for the
Chester plant. The likelihood of the Chester plant going forward at this
point is slim while the Westinghouse plant has received a commitment for
tonnage from Philadelphia.19
The inability of Chester to maintain control over the trash to steam
project might be blamed on its inexperience in economic development.
However, one could interpret the venture as the city's effort to gain
experience in creating an economic development project. The scandal
surrounding Leake's hiring of a local minority contractor is not unlike
the debates over affirmative action in other urban cities. It is
interesting to contemplate what might have happened if the city were not
as vulnerable to its reputation for patronage. Also newspaper interviews
revealed that the project lacked widespread support from the citizenry.
If Chester's black resident's had recognized city officials as legitimate
leaders, and had seen the project as part of a larger and more inclusive
vision for the rebirth of Chester, citizens might have provided enough
19 See Philadelphia Inquirer; March, 1991
support to allow the city to maintain control over these projects.
THE HISTORY OF COMWNITY-BASED DEVELOPMENT
Community-based efforts in the 1980s began as a response to development
controlled or influenced by the county. As the battles between the county
and the city unfolded, community activists (aided by their friends in the
foundations and other regional funders) redirected their focus away from
opposition to county-influenced development to an ongoing a struggle with
the city's.
Early community-based efforts were not successful at challenging the
city's leadership. This is due, in part, to the fragmentation of
community based efforts. In this section we will look at three community-
based projects; the East Side Caucus, the Chester Regeneration Project,
and Common Ground. We shall see that in each project, efforts failed
because these efforts were not guided by a social movement; this resulted
in fragmentation. We also look at a new effort directed at redressing
some of the mistakes made in earlier community based efforts --- the
Chester Organizing Project. We will explore the source of fragmentation
in the last section, Leadership in the Black Community.
Early Resistance to Development
According to community based planning documents and interviews with city
and community planners, community residents were successful at blocking
plans for high-tech industrial development along the proposed Route 291
during the early 19803.2' This project was one in a series of proposals
that had county support for development along the waterfront. Two
community-based development projects, the East Side Caucus and The
Chester Regeneration Project were, in part, a response to county-
controlled development. Unfortunately, the reaction was never redefined a
self propelled social movement. Rather than building a social movement to
guide development efforts, these projects concentrated more heavily on
production and technical proficiency than on building a grassroots base or
developing leadership.
The East Side Caucus
In 1985, RDC Inc -- a county-based non-profit agency established for the
20 Unfortunately, planning documents do not detail this struggle, nor did
I uncover the details of this struggle during my interviews.
promotion of economic development in Delaware County 1 -- presented the
Pew Charitable Trusts with a proposal to initiate a high-tech development
project along the city's industrial waterfront. The RDC proposal lacked
significant community involvement. As a result, The Conservation Company
(as a consultant for the Pew Trusts) created the East Side Caucus from
representatives of community organizations, youth organizations and the
religious community. ESC summed up what it believed to be the problem of
previous development projects:
"Past plans developed by the Chester Group, the
Riverfront Development Corporation22 and others,
while well conceived, failed to incorporate the
full range of common interests and concerns.
Community leaders on the East Side feel that
their involvement in the planning process has
been token. As a result, plans to move forward
have been effectively resisted and blocked by the
residents who would be adversely affected by
development projects. ,23
The Conservation Company, Pew, and others intended for the ESC to be a
"strong, stable community-based organization" that sought to "make the
revitalization of the East Side a major initiative in the revitalization
of the City of Chester as a whole." 24
Although the East Side Caucus began with a vision and the potential to be
the spring board of a social movement, it never became more than a
somewhat isolated project between concerned citizens and institutions in
Chester. Christina Klugar, former program officer of the Pew Trusts,
observed that the caucus was never a real partnership between community
groups and concerned citizens of Chester, with representation from
government and private industry. She blames the failure of building the
partnership on Pew's lack of active involvement in the project. It
appears that the failure resulted, in part, because local leadership was
21 RDC, Inc. whose recent history in Chester started without considering
community participation, is now reevaluating its role in the city of Chester.
RDC is currently the contractor for the city's revision of its compresive master
plan. It is an organization that is technically competent in economic
development. In its early history was more closely aligned to the county.
22 The Chester Group was originally an alliance between two organizations
with a regional focus, PECO and Widener College; both institutions currently sit
on the board of the county Chamber of Commerce. The Chester Group later became
the Riverfront Development Corporation
23 Urban Revitalization Plan and Proposal: East Side Caucus, Inc, City of
Chester, Pa; 1986; pI
24 ibid; pIII
not developed, skill building was not done, and broad-based community
participation was never implemented as part of the project --- all the
components necessary if a large scale planning project is to become an
integral part of a social movement. A closer look at the details of ESC's
history demonstrates that all these components were missing.
For example, finding local leadership was a problem from the very
beginning. While there were many concerned citizens, few felt there was
a local person capable of running a complex organization, such as that
which ESC was designed to be. Two concerned East Side residents, Bernice
Burton and her husband, were the most active in the organization and took
on leadership roles in the beginning. However, the search for an
executive director was a long one. Finally Charles Grandeson -- a private
black developer who had done projects in Philadelphia, Wilmington, and
Florida -- was selected.
The choice of Grandeson turned out to be an ill-fated one. Accounts from
several observers revealed that Grandeson seemed more interested in
following his own pursuits than in developing a community-based
organization. The result of Grandeson's leadership was that ESC had a
heavy emphasis on housing development.
As for community participation, the East Side Caucus' Revitalization Plan
included a wide range of community projects whose activities included:
* Cooperative and Homeownership Opportunity
Program
* New Businesses for Chester (an entrepreneurial
training program)
* Food Co-Op
* Block Beautification Program
* Neighborhood Housing Service Partnership
The Caucus also anticipated future projects.
However, projects such as the Block Beautification Program and the Food
Co-Op never got off the ground. The Neighborhood Beautification Program
was designed to organize neighborhood residents to improve the physical
quality of their neighborhood by building community gardens, painting and
cleaning. The program also included seasonal block parties and a well
developed block captain system. By not developing projects like the
Neighborhood Beautification Program, the ESC lost an opportunity to get
people out into the streets and mobilize concern about their community.
What exists today of the Revitalization Plan were those pieces that were
initiated by established organizations who were originally members of ESC.
New Businesses for Chester, an entrepreneurial training program was
continued under the auspices of RDC, Inc. The housing cooperative piece of
the Cooperative and Homeownership Opportunity Program is now run under
Better Housing for Chester.
The ESC project left concerned Chester citizens and activists in worse
shape than it found them. No new skills were developed and the visible
failure left many disheartened.
Chester Regeneration Project
The Chester Regeneration Project (CRP), also initiated in 1985, took a
direction that was somewhat more technical from its inception. Like ESC,
the CRP came on the heels of development projects imposed on the community
from outside. Led by community activist Rev. Johnnie Monroe, the project
was focused on a vision of self-reliance. The intent of CRP was to
promote "a process of economic development that seeks to decrease
vulnerability of Chester to outside forces while increasing the local
community's power over its own economic destiny." 25
Somewhere along the way, the Regeneration Group never developed the
connection between self-reliance and the movement to increase the
community's power. In fact, both aspects of the mission were overshadowed
by technical aspects of data collection and analysis for a research
report. A consulting firm, Resource Planning and Management Systems,
produced a technical report (completed in 1987) that inventoried business
needs and community expenditures. The participants in the project were
very proud of the report. However, no organization took responsibility
for continuing research and implementation. The Human Services Inventory,
which was to complement to the Local Economy Inventory, was never done.
By not doing the Human Services Inventory, local groups missed an
opportunity to get out into the community and generate grassroots support
for a community project.
The Regeneration Group started with 37 representatives from various
community-based organizations and churches but dwindled down to 4 before
the report was completed. Currently, the Regeneration Group lies dormant.
With the transfer of Rev. Monroe to another church, the movement lost
25 Resource Planning and Management Systems, Local Economy Inventory, 1984
momentum.2' Again no attempt was made by Monroe or other participants in
the project to increase local capacity.
Thus both of these early development projects missed an opportunity to
develop leadership and organization skills which could later be built
upon. These skills would have been transferable to real estate or other
kinds of development. The stage theory of community development points to
the need for such skill building, concurrently with the organizing of
residents. Grandeson also failed to transfer skills to other board and
staff members. In fact, one interviewee mentioned that Grandeson
ostracized Bernice Burton.
Conon Ground and the Chester Organizing Project
Although the East Side Caucus and the Chester Regeneration Group failed to
integrate community organizing in their projects, more recently community
activists and ministers have begun an attempt to organize Chester. In
December of 1988, a coalition of prominent Chester churches and community-
based organizations called Common Ground formed to "give Chester's
disempowered residents a voice in the planning and decision-making
regarding the use of CDBG funds."27
The story of Common Ground is Chester's most dramatic example of the
conflict between the Chester community -- consisting of community-based
organizations, churches, concerned citizens and other activists -- versus
city government. In 1989, Mayor Leake made an agreement, at least in
principle, with the coalition that a citizen participation board should be
formed to influence the spending of CDBG funds. Common Ground believed
that by presenting proposals for CDBG spending would effectively amount to
citizen participation and bring them one step closer to their goal of
institutionalizing a participation board. But later that year, the Mayor
and council refused to include proposals from members of Common Ground in
the CDBG budget which lead to a confrontational hearing. Mayor Leake's
rejection letter, according to the written history of Common Ground 2 ,
made a point of driving a wedge between the clergy and community
26 Bednar, Ronald; "A Critical Assessment of Regeneration Planning in
Community Economic Development"; unpublished student paper; University of
Pennsylvania; Fall 1988
27 Excerpt from Chester Organizing Project's grant application to the
Campaign for Human Development (CHD), 1990
21 ibid
organizations. By subsequently meeting with church leaders that had
provided her with political support in the past, Leake was able to weaken
and eventually break up the coalition.
Upon reflection, Chester community organizer James Brunswick 29 realized
that it was probably a tactical mistake to have groups present individual
proposals. Common Ground made the mistake of letting individual groups and
churches pursue their own self interests instead of working together and
sticking to their plan to create a viable citizen participation board.
Also, Brunswick believes Common Ground was weakened because church
leadership did not have an organized power-base to back up their efforts.
If we were to place the experience of Chester within King's stage theory
of community development, one could conclude that these organizations
that could have been the beginnings of Chester's grassroots contingent,
had virtually skipped the organizing stage.
The Chester Organizing Project (COP) was founded by members of Common
Ground with the assistance of the Regional Council of Neighborhood
Organizations. COP is trying to rebuild a bridge between church leaders
and community groups. The organization also seeks to build a large
grassroots constituency with the churches as its power base. COP is
currently in the process of extending and strengthening its membership
base. COP plans to carefully structure a power base within the
congregations and their parish communities, as well as provide leadership
training for ministerial and lay leaders. The efforts of COP over an 18
month period will culminate in a city-wide conference which will focus on
developing and documenting a community-based vision for the city.
Strategic goals of COP include building collective leadership through a
sponsoring committee that is broadly representative of local churches,
doing a power analysis of Chester City and the surrounding county, and
fundraising.3*
29 Brunswick is an employee of the Regional Council of Neighborhood
Organizations (RCNO) as well as the lead organizer of the Chester Organizing
Project. RCNO promotes community organizing and trains organizers throughout the
Delaware Valley.
30 A more detailed discussion of COP's goals and objectives, an 18 month
timeline, and results from its survey of pastoral leadership can be found in the
CHD application.
The long term objective of the Chester Organizing Project is stated at
building a "broad-based organization powerful enough to challenge the
corruption, and organized crime which have set the city's agenda for so
long. ""
The challenges faced by the Organizing Project include dealing with the
changing nature of church membership from neighborhood or parish-based to
commuter-based, and the increasing demand for social services which drains
much of the churches' resources, as well as the limited energy and time of
church pastors.
Given that COP has a strategy to address the issues of power, leadership
training and a inclusive process for developing a community-based vision
of development, two questions arise: 1) How well can COP connect the
various parts of this strategy (i.e. building a power base, leadership
development, training, community vision) to actual development projects?
and 2) How clearly do COP leaders understand the relationship between each
piece of the strategy and the broader context of exogenously determined
economics and politics. It is in the process of actual development that
the community learns its limitations given economic reality. By
understanding economic development the community gains power necessary to
confront the vested interests of the county.
Chester activists, through reevaluating their experiences in Common Ground
and creating the Chester Organizing Project, realized that they missed a
crucial component in their strategy --- grassroots organizing. These
activists have come back to what King calls the organizing stage. This
doubling back between stages in community development is a common
occurrence according to King. If an organized grassroots coalition can
frame issues within the context of a broad vision after generating enough
interest among the populace to bring the coalition the strength of a
social movement, it can address what many perceive as fragmentation and
may give Chester development efforts increased chances for success.
Because the COP seeks to redress issues of accountability and leadership
through grassroots organizing (as well as establishing a well structured
system of accountability) it has the potential to be the focal point of a
social movement.
31 excerpt from Common Ground's CHD grant application, prepared by James
Brunswick, 1990
UNDERSTANDING LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT IN CHESTER' S BLACK COMMUNITY; A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The conflicts between community and city, city and county and the
fragmentation of community based efforts all have their roots in the
leadership vacuum of Chester's black community. To understand the local
leadership vacuum in Chester, a historical perspective is needed.
Chester's black community makes up the majority of the population and
currently comprises the community's most powerful public officials. One
would therefore expect a significant amount of Chester's leadership to
emanate from the black community. This chapter draws heavily on the
dissertation of Anna Squarrel-Jenkins, Leadership in a Black Community: A
Model for the Study of Urban Communities to show that the dearth of
leadership in the black community is caused by: limited roles for blacks
within the economic sphere, decline of influence of the traditional
community-based leaders during the sixties, lack of accountability among
public officials, and the lack of a tradition of community activism.
According to Squarrel-Jenkins, there were very few opportunities for
blacks to take on leadership roles in the economic sphere because of
racism. As early as the 1940's, black and white Chesterites were
competing for menial jobs as Chester's industrial base eroded. The few
proprietorships that existed and continue to exist in Chester's black
community are concentrated in personal services such as undertaking or
barbering. Because these services are based in a localized market and, in
the case of barbering, depend on disposable income, they are very limited
in their economic impact.
Blacks were limited to leadership roles that were internal to the
community until the Civil Rights era. Leadership was legitimized through
community service, leadership in the neighborhood church, and adherence to
certain social norms and moral behavior. This formed the traditional
leadership structure in Black Chester.
With the decline of economic resources available to the black community
and the community's increasing dependence on the welfare system, the white
community's influence in establishing social norms and models of propriety
increased substantially through the introduction of social workers in the
black community. (pgg 173 -178) Because they were no longer establishing
the primary models of status and achievement, the traditional leaders'
power began to wane.
The power of traditional leaders further deteriorated as the civil rights
movement opened up many opportunities for blacks within the larger
society. In Chester, this meant that many of the city's most capable
youth sought avenues outside the traditional leadership structure (and
outside of Chester as well) for status and recognition. (pg 210) With new
opportunities for education and job advancement, the status (of being well
educated or having a professional title for example) provided by these
opportunities became a new criteria for selecting leaders.
"[The emergence of these new criteria] introduced an
incongruence for the existing leadership [i.e. traditional]
ranks. These new people possessed knowledge, skills, and
experiences which existing organization leaders saw as
beneficial. Therefore, they were encouraged to join the
various community-based organizations, but generally, they
expected to move into leading positions in these organizations
not by virtue of their service and proven commitment but by
virtue of their objective potential to make specific kinds of
contributions. They were incongruent, therefore, in that
their incomes or social class levels were similar to those of
existing leaders, but they had often not won high status
recognition in the community. They had skipped the
socialization process of moving up through the ranks." (pg
281)
"These new people" that Squarrel-Jenkins refers to took on leadership
roles in the public sphere and make up a large majority of Chester's black
public officials. Public officials or external gatekeepers are:
"Black people who hold positions of power which, ostensibly,
make them representatives of the black community. The roles
which they hold are not part of the institutional structures
to be found within the black community. Instead, their roles
most often reflect the ability of the power structure of the
established white community to penetrate the boundaries of the
black community." (pg 281)
Because the leadership roles of public officials are not part of any
institutional structures to be found within the black community, these
officials have little or no accountability to the black community which
they supposedly represent. Interviews with the late Arthur Early, a black
state representative, and another elected official revealed "incidents
from their own pasts which, in other places might well have compromised
their abilities to gain political offices." (pg 242) Below, in his own
words, Representative Early reveals how little accountability black
elected officials have to the black community.
"Individuals who maintain party support [sic] are safe. Even
personal scandal such as moral or criminal infringements
cannot hurt an individuals chances as long as they have the
support of the [Republican party] organization." (pg 242)
Squarrels-Jenkin's survey of Chester residents revealed that an
overwhelming majority of elected officials were identified as well known
but not well respected.32
Community activists came on the Chester scene in the early 1960's.
Squarrel-Jenkins notes that the activists' standing in the community was
not legitimized through the traditional leadership structure. Because
their style is relatively more confrontational than the traditional
leaders and they are in constant conflict with public officials they are,
to a certain extent, outsiders. Activists are held up to intense public
scrutiny within the community. Because they were not based within the
traditional leadership structure, they sometimes have difficulties in
aligning themselves with it. From the view of both the traditional
leaders and the public officials, activists are generally associated with
stirring up a fuss, rather than with solving problems.
The power of the activist is ephemeral. The activist does not have to be
associated with various traditional community institutions such as the
church or the local NAACP, nor is their role legitimized by a
distinguished record of community service or behavioral norms. The
activist simply recognizes the popular sentiments within the community,
possesses or successfully claims the legitimacy to articulate these
sentiments, and has the ability to mobilize the citizenry.
It is little wonder then, that activists did not succeed in
institutionalizing a power base or within the community, nor did they
succeed in leaving a legacy of a well developed philosophy of community
struggle during the 1960's. (pg 236)
Within Chester's black community, we find the source of many of the
conflicts between county and the city (and indirectly with the community),
conflicts between city officials and the community, as well as the source
of fragmentation of community based efforts. These conflicts arise
because many of the dynamics that Squarrel-Jenkins identifies in the 1950s
and 1960s still manifest themselves within Chester today.
There are few blacks who can take on leadership roles within the economic
sphere. Arthur Bean -- a local businessman, president of the Chester
Businessmen's Association, and board member of the County Chamber of
Commerce -- is one of a small number of exceptions. Chester's political
officials are isolated between a manipulative county machine and a
32 Squarrel-Jenkins' sample was composed of 50 black Chester residents. The
sample reflected a range of demographics and social statuses
populace that holds them in disdain. As we have seen, the activists, now
leaders of Chester's community-based organizations continue to have a
tenuous relationship with the traditional leadership of Chester's
churches. Because activists and traditional leaders have always lacked
complete solidarity, this affected their confrontation with Mayor Leake.
Furthermore, activists did not establish a tradition of community activism
and struggle. Therefore Chester was not able to progress from a
dependency stage to an organizing stage to an institution-building stage.
Without a tradition of struggle, Chesterites were never able to develop a
social movement from their acts of protest and attempts to establish
organizations. This results in the fragmentation of community-based
efforts that is still evident today.
CHAPTER THREE
KEY PLAYERS
As we have seen in Chapter Two, the apparent impasse in economic
development over the last ten years can be best understood by studying the
interactions between institutions and individuals. In order to better
understand the conflicts between community/city and county, community and
city, and the fragmentation of community-based efforts which contribute to
the current state of impasse, it is important to know exactly what people
think about the current state of economic development in Chester.
Chapter 3 focuses on the responses from approximately 20 interviews with
representatives of community-based organizations, the city's development
agency, the county's development agencies, banks, foundations, and the
State Department of Community Affairs. All interviewees have experience
with economic development projects in the city of Chester.
Interviewees were asked what were the problems, what were the sources of
these problems, what could be done to improve the state of impasse in
economic development, and what was their vision of a revitalized Chester.
Through the interview process I learned that many of the Gittell factors
are indeed important to the revitalization of Chester in the minds of key
players, giving support to Gittell's theory. Interviewees cited
leadership, community participation, and the need for some center of
gravity for community based efforts. Guided by Gittell's factors I also
asked the interviewees about community vision.
While the interviewees agree on what some of the problems are, that there
is a lot of work that must be done and there is a lot that must change in
Chester; they generally do not agree on the content of that work, nor the
character of the changes. In many cases, the disparity in views stems
from where the interviewees stand at different points in the
county/city/community conflicts. To make clear the lines of dissagreement
and conflict, interviewees are identified by their institutions and its
geographic sphere of influence. Though the number of representatives
from each group may not be statistically representative, they reflect
substantive divergences in opinions by people with decision making
authority or influence in agencies that are important to Chester's
revitalization. Table Three is a chart that lists the respondents, their
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The chapter is divided into five sections. The sections reflect those
subjects that came up most often in interviewee responses. The first
section, Perceptions reveals what respondents thought were the major
problems in Chester that prohibited the implementation of an economic
development strategy. Visions, reveals what interviewees thought a
revitalized Chester should look like and discusses the conflict among
those visions. Local Leadership explores who might implement those
visions. Community Participation discusses what many respondents believed
to be one of the most vital ingredients in an improved revitalization
strategy. A final section, What is Really Going On Here? draws on the
differing responses of interviewees to flesh out the underlying conflicts
among county, city, and community.
PERCEPTIONS
Many interviewees were concerned with the way Chester is percieved, both
by the community itself and by those outside the community. Corruption,
disorganization of local government, fragmentation of community-based
initiatives, lack of community spirit, and a milieu of social problems ---
these are all words used by interviewees in describing the city of
Chester. The negative image of Chester is pervasive. It is shared by
Chesterites as well as those institutions outside of Chester that are
important to the city's economic future.
Gittell suggests that a community's positive self-perceptions are
important to the implementation of a community development strategy.
Positive perceptions are critical in getting a broad-based constituency to
support and actively participate in the community's revitalization.
According to Gittell, community perceptions are positive if citizens
believe the benefits of economic development will accrue to them and when
they believe that there is a strong likelihood of the success development
efforts. Such beliefs imply a certain level of trust in local officials.
It is equally important to consider what outside institutions think of
Chester. These institutions provide monetary, technical and political
support. Outsider perceptions influence the prescriptive solutions that
define the programs or policies these institutions use when working in
Chester. When these prescriptions work at cross purposes, they contribute
to the impasse in Chester's economic development.
The following section will briefly describe residents' perception of
corruption in Chester's city government and will discuss the perception of
government corruption by those outside of Chester. Other views of
"outsiders" discussed in this section include regional funders' perception
that community-based efforts are disorganized and fragmented.
Corruption
Recently, the corruption of Chester's city government has been a hot topic
of area newspapers. The Delaware County Daily Times runs articles almost
daily on HUD investigations, conflicts of interest, grand jury
testimonies, and indictments of local officials.
As Chapter Two revealed, Chester's reputation for corruption is rooted in
fact. Corruption is a legacy left by the Republican party and almost 100
years of patronage. It is maintained by an at-large voting structure with
Republican party bosses pulling strings behind the scenes. County
officials contribute to Chester's negative image by denouncing Chester
politics in the county paper as they did with regard to the trash to steam
plant.
Chester's political corruption affects its citizenry. In Chester's last
election, voter participation was less than 25%. Community needs
assessments sponsored by the Scott Foundation between 1984 and 1989
revealed that corruption and apathy appeared among the top five problems
in Chester. A 1989 Pennsylvania Crime Commission Report states that
because of political officials connections to organized crime, "the faith
that the electorate feels in its legitimate government officials surely
suffers".
According to Gittell, community psychology is an important factor in
getting past the inertia in economic development. In Chester, the
negative community psychology is determined, in part, by the lack of faith
in local politicians. Given the evidence above, it is clear that local
politicians would have the trust, nor the ability, to motivate the
community under these conditions.
While local leadership is important, as a practical matter it is necessary
to get monetary, technical and political support from outside the city.
Therefore, it is important to consider what outside institutions think of
Chester. Bill Payne, of RDC Inc., believes that Chester's redevelopment
will only happen if there is a change in the perceptions and
preconceptions by outsiders. Luis Mora believes that in order to attract
investment, Chester must create an "image that convinces people that it is
a desirable place to work and do business".
Almost everyone (with the exception of city employees) agreed that it was
necessary for Chester's local government to change in the long run. Kent
James of the Chester Community Improvement Project, a local nonprofit
housing corporation and Bill Payne of RDC, Inc noted that changes in the
city's organization were even more important than changes in personnel.
Others merely cited the need for general political reform in order for
complete revitalization to occur. However, representatives from area
organizations explained that local government's reputation would not
prohibit them from continuing or expanding their commitment to Chester's
economic development.
Although Chester's corruption was at the tip of interviewees' tongues,
when asked about Chester's corruption, few knew specific details. In
fact, most respondents were quite cautious about revealing their
suspicions about Chester's "indiscretions." Interviewee perceptions of
corruption often appear incomplete or contradictory. One knowledgeable
interviewee believes that much of the controversy surrounding the use of
CDBG dollars can be attributed to the inflexibility of HUD guidelines as
to how CDBG dollars should be used for economic development. Theresa
Heintz, remarked how some of the negative images have been exaggerated.
More revealing are the comments by Arthur Bean, a local Chester
businessman, board member of the county Chamber of Commerce, and former
board member of the Chester Regeneration Project:
"What we don't need is any more negative
publicity about this city. The county paper does
not give a balanced view of what goes on in
Chester. I have tried to get stories printed on
organizations like Churches Against Drugs or the
positive accomplishments of our city's youth.
And do you know what they tell me? Mr. Bean,
stories like that don't sell newspapers."
It seems that those who have experience working with the county and more
intimate knowledge of the city, but also a commitment to seeing it change
for the benefit of Chester residents, believe that the sources of
Chester's negative image extend beyond criminals and beyond the actions of
the local government.
As Bean points out, the perception of investors, funders, and politicians
is influenced by the local media. In addition to the Daily Times, several
town papers, as well as the Philadelphia Inquirer, carry frequent articles
about Chester politics. Consequently, Chester's notoriety within the
Philadelphia metropolitan area is inescapable. Given the county's behind-
the-scenes involvement in Chester's economy and the history of the
county's non-reciprocal relationship with the city (in which the county
views Chester as an economic resource without feeling a responsibility for
the economic welfare of Chester residents and businesses), the county is
able to isolate Chester politically and influence perceptions of the city
to outside investors and funders with the aid of the county media.
Although Chester's image of corruption is based on fact, it also has
become a weapon for the county in its struggle to continue dominating
Chester.
Fragmentation
King (1981) believes that without a community vision, activists and
planners cannot clearly see how their work fits into a whole and
contributes to the resolution of the community's struggles. A fragmented
community is not able progress between King's stages of development.
Regional funders expressed concern over the fragmentation and duplication
of efforts among community-based organizations. In addition to the
fragmentation at the community level that King talks about, regional
funders also talked about the need for more cooperation among key players
at different levels of government, as well as between local government and
community-based organizations. Representatives from the State Department
of Community Affairs (DCA) and others said that they would like to see
more cooperation among Chester's key players. Many of DCA's current
efforts were designed to address the issue of fragmentation. For example,
DCA used the influence of funding to get community-based housing
developers and the CRA to work together. Similarly, RDC Inc, a countywide
nonprofit organization dedicated to the advancement of economic
development, has been working with banks and local housing developers to
organize a housing caucus in order to bring in more private resources and
better coordinate housing development.
Other respondents argued that cooperation between the private sector, city
and county government has been minimal. Luis Mora from the Department of
Community Development and Public Responsibility of CoreStates Bank, felt
that in order for his department to stand behind a comprehensive
revitalization effort, more vested stakeholders with resources and
influence must make a commitment to Chester's revitalization.
Beth Denitz of the Pew Charitable Trusts expressed concern over the
fragmentation and duplication of efforts among community-based
organizations. Although several community-based organizations currently
have been forming various coalitions and formalizing networks amongst
themselves, Denitz attitude towards further efforts in Chester seems
cautious. This is understandable given their grand failure with the East
Side Caucus in 1984.
Fragmentation between community-based groups has three origins. It is
partly a result of the lack of leadership among community based
organizations. It is also symptomatic of the pattern among community-
based efforts to react against outside forces but not move beyond the
initial stages of projects. Fragmentation at the community level also
results from a history of conflict between Chester's traditional
leadership and activists in the black community. The fragmentation
between the community and the city results from a history of conflicts
which can be traced back to activist agitation in the sixties.
VISIONS
The importance of a common vision is expressed in the work of Gittell as
well as that of King. Gittell stresses that an inclusive approach which
is important both in the initial process of developing that vision as
well in developing programmatic outcomes that are defined by that vision.
By soliciting maximum participation by all community stakeholders
throughout the process, opposition is minimized. Gittell's cooperative
model is in contrast to the assumptions underlying King's stage theory.
King's model of community development anticipates conflict among
stakeholders. King stresses the importance of a vision as a way of
uniting the local community in order to confront and eventually to wrestle
control from others outside the community. In King's model a community
vision is needed so that activists and planners understand how their work
fits into the whole picture. Also, to the extent that a community vision
exists, development efforts can be conceptualized as part of a holistic
effort --- not merely a loosely related set of programs.
The degree to which there is some overlap in vision, there is a beginning
point for disparate groups to work together or in a complementary way
toward community goals. However, what we find in Chester is a
multiplicity of visions. Furthermore visions from representatives of
community-based versus city versus county planners betray underlying
conflicts.
Respondents' visions of a healthy Chester were influenced by the scope of
their current work or their civic interests. This resulted in a range of
responses covering subjects from social services to economic development.
Among the elements of a healthy Chester, the one most often mentioned was
related to using industrial development as an economic development
strategy. We will also look at the tendency of Chester planners to look
exclusively inward for solutions to the problems of revitalization or what
the former director of the county Industrial Development Corporation
called "not thinking outside the box".
Industrial Development
Understanding interviewees' views on industrial development is important
because heavy industry has been at the center of Chester's economy for
more than 70 years and many believe that it should continue to play a
large role in the city's revitalization. All of Chester's waterfront
land, which is about one-fifth of the total land in the city, is zoned for
industrial use. The redevelopment of Chester's waterfront property for
industrial use has been the subject of controversy over the last decade.
For many years the city was lax about enforcing zoning codes along the
waterfront. Today many small businesses and homes are interspersed with
industrial uses. Though the majority of the non-industrial buildings are
in dilapidated condition and are slowly being vacated, they still house
several poor families and small proprietorships.
Interviewees agreed that industrial development should play some part in
the city's revitalization. City planners, county representatives, and
some regional funders agreed that industrial development was important to
the economic future of Chester. On the other hand, community activists
either did not mention industrial development or down-played its
importance to the city's revitalization. Even among those that agreed on
the importance of industrial development, there was not unanimous
agreement on the intensity (heavy or light industrial) or the scale
(number of factories). Regional funders and planners, county
representatives, and the CRA were more likely to support large scale or
heavy industrial development.
Regional funders and planners are committed to an industrial strategy.
They offer justifications including the availability of recyclable
industrial buildings to its impact on other aspects of community
revitalization (such as housing). Luis Mora has worked for a number of
years with nonprofit housing groups in Chester and has had experience with
economic development at the state level in Louisiana. He felt that
attracting large industry is necessary for Chester's revitalization
because it was the only way to provide a secure employment base and
furthermore "any housing strategy cannot survive in the long run without
an employment base."
The Department of Community Affairs felt that the availability of
recyclable industrial buildings along Chester's waterfront provided an
excellent opportunity to provide employment. In the early 1980's, DCA ran
a program in which they supported two industrial park sites dedicated to
attracting small manufacturers. One of those sites has been abandoned as
a project. The other is the Riverbridge site currently owned by Delaware
County.
In the eyes of county officials, industrial development in Chester is
essential because of its importance to the regional and the county's
economy. The county is currently recruiting small businesses for sites
along Route 291. Given past conflicts over economic development between
the city and the county, as well as the controversy involved with
displacing residents and businesses in the area of the new route, it is
quite likely that conflict may resurface over the project at some point in
the future.
The plan to expand Route 291, often referred to as the industrial highway,
supports the county and the city's vision of a reindustrialized Chester.
The county has aggressively expended a lot of resources and energy towards
pushing the expansion of the highway forward.33 (See Figure 1) The city,
usually following the county leadership, has supported industrial
development as part of its larger strategy to attract all kinds of
businesses to the area in the hope that these businesses will bring
employment ."
A large part of the vision of the Chester Redevelopment Authority carries
remnants of past controversy. The expansion of Route 291 and the
accompanying industrial development was protested and blocked by citizens
who would have been displaced by the expansion of the highway. CRA's
vision, as expressed by CRA's director of planning, Steve Merriken, is
focused on a strategy of resolving conflicting land uses near the
waterfront and Route 291. Merriken would like to see the waterfront areas
completely rezoned to heavy and light industrial. His viewpoint of the
fate of families currently living in those areas (see Figure 2) seems
clinical. He believes, "It will be much less costly now to relocate
" interview with Chris Franklin, Government Relations Representative,
County Chamber of Commerce also testimonials of Delaware County Council to
Pennsylvania Dept. of Transportation
3 Interview with Willie Mae Wells, Executive Director of the Chester
Redevelopment Authority.
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families (impacted by the expansion of Route 291) because of the level of
abandonment, since the highway plans were first proposed".
Thus, CRA's vision of Chester is a narrow one. It is heavily focused on
physical planning and bringing in industry. Community residents opposed
the expansion of the industrial highway in the past because it would
displace families and small businesses located in the area and because the
decision making process lacked community involvement. Although the CRA
realizes that they must at least make some gesture towards community
participation, the substance of city planners' comments reveal that they
are motivated by the desire to see that the plans get implemented without
disruption from the community. "If we don't get community participation
from the beginning someone will be complaining that we didn't include
them." " Given the way economic development programs have been run in
the past, it appears that CRA's viewpoint is that, effectively, only
potential employers and the city need be included in this (or any future)
strategy.
The responses from Chester residents like Kent James and Theresa Heintz
reflect a desire for a more toned down focus on industrial development
than that envisioned by the county or Merriken. Theresa Heintz, chair of
the City Planning Commission and a small business owner, felt that
industrial development should be of a moderate scale. Kent James,
director of CCIP a local nonprofit housing organization, thought that
small business rather than industrial development should be the focus of
economic development. These residents' responses reflect concerns
brought out in past community-based economic development initiatives. As
mentioned in Chapter Two, the reaction against the high-tech development
plans proposed by RDC and others in the early 1980's was because the plan
did not consider the fate of poorer citizens that lived near these
industrial areas. Furthermore, citizens were not consulted regarding the
content of any of these plans.
The success of a community vision is dependent upon the degree to which it
incorporates the concerns of the broadest spectrum of the community
according to Gittell. In Gittell's estimation, the success of an
industrial development strategy -- if it is considered as one part of the
community vision -- will depend upon its ability to incorporate the
concerns of a wide range of constituents. However, in King' s view, the
s Interview with a city planner
vision must be used as a unifying force so that through their collective
power, the community can effectively negotiate with more powerful vested
interests from outside the community.
When visions reflect conflicting interests, it sets the stage for
conflict. Visions surrounding the idea of industrial development reflect
such conflicts. Most agree that industrial development is a good way to
create jobs for the people of Chester. However there is little agreement
among anyone about what the scale or intensity of industrial development
should be. Furthermore industrial development along the waterfront is the
source of controversy between advocates of Chester residents who live near
the waterfront and those -- especially county and city officials -- who
support industrial development on those properties. Given the ability of
activists to block development plans in the past, industrial development
may continue to be at an impasse until the conflicts can be resolved.
Inward Looking Vision or "Not Thinking Outside the Box"
Tom Rapone of the Delaware County Industrial Development Corporation
(Delco IDC) coined the phrase "thinking outside the box" during my
interview with him. He said that Chester planners must begin "thinking
outside the box" --- that is, understanding their economic situation in
the context of county and regional trends in order to begin a substantial
revitalization process.
Although Rapone' s observation of being able to understand the community' s
economic situation in the context of larger economic trends is a valid
one, we should not confuse Tom Rapone's idea of thinking outside the box
with Gittell's inclusive vision of community development. If we look at
Rapone's comment in the context of county development initiatives,
especially in facilitating the development of Route 291 as discussed in
Chapter Two, we can interpret his observation as reflective of the
county's position that Chester should subordinate its own objectives to
regional and county objectives.
Even though I question Tom Rapone's underlying motivation expressed in
his observation that planners in the city of Chester need to think outside
the box, this description of the tendency towards an inward looking vision
is accurate when applied to community-based planners.
There is a long history of inward-looking visions which began in the early
1980s. As a response to plans that did not take into account community
needs or community viewpoint, activists responded by creating plans of
their own which were focused on promoting self-sufficiency. The concept
of self-sufficiency manifested itself in plans like the East Side Caucus
which were focused mostly on narrowly defined needs and community
resources. The idea of self-sufficiency was further developed as the
ideology behind the Chester Regeneration Project. This kind of
ideological thinking can severely limit the impact of community-based
projects if strategies are not developed in the context of the larger
political, economic and social development picture.
Locally-based planners still don't seem to be thinking outside the box.
The economic development strategies they discribed focus on the best use
of specifically local resources. "We should make the best of the
resources that we have available...", said Bill Payne. "What Chester does
not need is some new institution. We should concentrate on using those
[local] institutions that have proven themselves technically capable",
remarked Nick Nagurny.
While the above comments may not, in themselves, be a source of
contention, what was noticeably absent from the comments of people like
Nagurny and Payne was the role that the county or regional sources play in
Chester's problems, its economy, or in the future of its revitalization.
Visions of a revitalized Chester are as varied as the number of key
players. Local Chesterites tend to focus exclusively inward for solving
Chester's problems, while county representatives believe Chester should
think of itself as part of the larger county and regional economy. The
city is sandwiched between these views. It believes that Chester should
be thought of as part of the county, but not only as an economic resource.
City representatives think the county should share in the responsibility
of Chester's recovery. What these disparate visions add up to is several
levels of conflict. The conflict in visions contributes to the impasse in
economic development.
LOCAL LEADERSHIP
Gittell defines leadership as the ability to engage the citizenry as well
as higher levels of government for the purpose of promoting economic
development. (Gittell 1988) Thus, a leader has stature among his/her
constituents as well as among powerful politicians and agency people at
higher levels of government. He/she also has the ability to manipulate
the right people to get money, permits, or political support. In short,
the leader can get things done.
However, responses from interviewees indicate that a leadership vacuum
exists in the city of Chester. The current vacuum of local leadership is
a critical issue for Chester, especially now, given that many of the
decisions that will affect Chester's economic future are being made on the
state and county level. Route 291's widening will impact homes along the
new route. The county is doing the most aggressive recruiting of
businesses that are to be located on that highway. Unless it changes
course, Chester will relinquish control of its own economic destiny to
the county. In this section we will use the Gittell criteria to explore
where potential leadership roles may exist.
Almost everyone interviewed expressed the need for leadership in one form
or another. However, no particular individual or institution was
consistently mentioned as being able to play a leadership role. In fact,
when asked if they could identify specific organizations or individuals
that could step into a leadership role in Chester's revitalization, many
were stuck for an answer.
Of those interviewees that did mention people with leadership potential,
there was no consensus on the individuals or the criteria for which people
identified potential leaders. Respondents criteria for potential leaders
reflected interviewees interests. State representatives and regional
funders that have a commitment to locally controlled development, seek to
avoid the city and the county. They identified Chester residents with
proven commitment to the community. County sources, seeking to benefit
economically from and possible to control Chester's development,
identified Chesterites with experience in county economic development.
In order to be able to motivate people, a leader must have the trust of
the citizenry according to Gittell. Community-based initiatives have
produced people that are knowledgeable about the needs of their community.
These community-based professionals are seen as trustworthy by the
community but are limited in their potential to provide leadership on
economic development initiatives. For example, interviewees from some
state and regional institutions respectfully noted the work of Sr. Marion
Fields and Kent James. These activists are respected locally and have the
ability to garner grass roots support on a moment's notice. However, most
of the experience of community leaders to date has been focused around
housing issues. Also, many of the organizations are still developing
their technical capacity and expertise. Because of limited funding, these
organizations are already stretched to the limit in terms of staff
capacity which leaves them little time to commit to initiatives other
than their own organizations.
In order to be able garner resources and have influence at different
levels of government, a leader must have credibility with these
institutions. Although no obvious institution or individual was
consistently identified to take on a leadership role by interviewees, two
other local people were mentioned by county and foundation sources because
of their past experience in economic development. Both individuals have
been involved with development at the county level. Bill Payne of RDC,
Inc and Theresa Heintz, Chairman of the City Planning Commission are both
respected by county economic development professionals and both are
extensively involved with community-based efforts. Payne, through his
work with RDC has worked with a number of community groups involved with
the Chester Regeneration Project and the East Side Caucus. He continues
to have a working relationship with many community-based professionals and
is currently working on organizing housing efforts.3' Heintz has
experience in county economic development agencies. However, she
mentioned that her primary interest is in more social service oriented
activities such as health and education.
Among interviewees whose organizational affiliation requires a more
regional view of the world, two interviewees mentioned the need for a
state representative to get involved in reshaping the image of Chester.
Tom Rapone named a particular state representative whom he thought was
bright and ambitious and Rapone noted that this representative's future
was tied to the future of Chester. Given the longstanding bottlenecks in
the widening of Route 291, there is a need for some influence at the state
level. Luis Mora, however, was uncertain if there was enough incentive
for a state representative to be involved with the revitalization of
Chester.
Squarrel-Jenkin's historical analysis (see Chapter Two) tells us that the
lack of accountability among the city's elected officials results from the
leadership structure within the black community. Therefore, in order to
insure accountability, a structure of leadership must be rebuilt that
connects a grassroots constituency directly to city hall. Currently
3' Local housing developers, banks, Chester RDA, and the State DCA have
recently put together a housing caucus in order to bring in more private
resources and better coordinate housing development.
there is an organizing effort underway amongst some of the most prominent
congregations in Chester to redress these issues.
This effort, called the Chester Organizing Project (COP), seeks to develop
a cadre of more accountable leaders and simultaneously restructure the
relationships between the community, community-based activists, churches
and local government. COP emerged from the experiences of the Common
Ground coalition discussed in Chapter Two. Presently, the efforts of COP
are focused on expanding its membership base, developing leadership,
creating a very detailed structure of accountability among church
leadership and their congregations and building trust between churches and
denominations. The use of churches as an organizing base is a
significant one. A 1987 focus group study conducted by Villanova
University revealed that churches were the only institutions in which
Chester residents had any confidence.7
While interviewees unanimously agree that a leadership vacuum exists in
Chester, they do not agree about what institutions are the best sources
for leadership. Nor do they agree about the criteria upon which to base
effective leadership. Institutions with a commitment to local control
look for commitment and credibility with the local constituency, others
rely on technical competence and credibility with higher levels of
government. Here again we find a source for potential impasse for
leadership that can motivate a broad based constituency around Chester's
economic development.
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION & A MOVEMENT TOWARDS SOCIAL CHANGE
As we noted above, members of Common Ground and COP recognized the need
for more community participation in economic development and local
government, respectively. In fact, almost all regional funders and
activists agreed that there was a need for more community participation
amongst Chester residents. Local Chester planners have come to terms with
the need for a more participatory planning process through their
experience in having planning projects blocked.
This section will chronicle funders' and activists' perspectives, as well
as documentation on community participation. We will then review two
different approaches to community participation in the programs of COP and
CRA.
37 cited in COP's grant application to CHD; 1991
Regional funders and activists mentioned the need for more active
community participation. There is evidence of apathy among Chester
citizens in low voter participation rates as well as in a community needs
assessment. The Scott Foundation contracted 4 community needs assessments
between 1984 and 1989. Apathy was cited among the top five problems in
Chester in the 1988 assessment. "There isn't the spirit [in Chester] like
there is in Camden" said Christina Klugar, former program officer of the
Pew Charitable Trust in referring to the East Side Caucus project versus
Pew's Camden initiative. Klugar points out that many of the opportunities
to get neighborhood people directly involved in the community's
revitalization, such as the Block Beautification Program, were never
pursued in the East Side Caucus project. City officials rarely emphasized
the need for more community participation and county officials did not
mention it at all.
Getting citizens involved in the plight of their community has been
strongest when in opposition to an elitist development efforts such as the
high-tech development project proposed by RDC in 1985. However, getting
broad-based participation in actual development projects has been less
successful. CDBG programs in the 1970's which required citizen
participation were sparsely attended.38 The Chester Regeneration Project
started off with approximately 37 active participants but dwindled down to
4 before the consultant report was published."
Foundation representatives and activists noted that many community-based
projects were too grandly conceived to be handled by groups with little
development experience. Funders and activists who were involved with the
projects were disappointed and frustrated with community-based efforts.
Other activists believe that the lack of a stable grass roots constituency
behind community-based efforts caused their success to be diminished.
Among activists and funders community participation is percieved to be a
neccesity for achieving development that is responsive to the needs of
Chester citizens. Among city officials community participation is a
neccesary, and perhaps even bothersome step in the planning process. In
the remainder of this section we will examine the how these perspectives
38 The community Development Block Grant Program: An analyses of Its
Impact in Delaware County; Health & Welfare Council, Inc., Delaware County
Area Office; 1977
" Based on Interview with Sr. Marion Fields and documents from Chester
Regeneration Project.
play themselves out in different approaches to community participation in
the Chester Organizing Project and through the planning process of the
Chester Redevelopment Authority.
The Chester Organizing Project is being staffed by James Brunswick of the
Regional Council of Neighborhood Organizations. According to Brunswick,
RCNO strongly believes and is trying to convince community economic
development professionals in the region that "you have to have an
organized power base where people have public skills and can negotiate
with public officials before development can be successful and before you
can have the kind of development that will benefit the lowest income folks
in the community. "40
While there is a good chance that RCNO's philosophy will be integrated
into the COP, this is not guaranteed. In fact, even though many of the
members of Common Ground make up the core membership of COP, the long term
objectives of COP have shifted from those of Common Ground. Common
Ground's primary goal was "to give Chester's disempowered residents a
voice in planning and decision making regarding the use of CDBG funds."'1
COP's long term goals are currently centered around changing the
leadership structure within the public sphere. Only time will tell
whether or not the expanded membership of COP will return to addressing
the issue of community participation in local economic development
decisions.
CRA's approach to community participation is based on less of a conviction
that community participation is neccesary for development that is
responsive to the community' s needs, than a neccesary step in order to get
projects approved. The CRA is currently engaged in an 18 month process
during which it will update its master plan. Despite the frustration with
actual projects, city planners have learned that it is critical to make at
least a good faith effort to solicit community involvement. RDC Inc, and
others have had their projects halted by neglecting to solicit community
opinion and participation from the very beginning. For this reason
neighborhood meetings, a citizen participation committee, and committee
approval will be institutionalized as part of the revision of Chester's
comprehensive master plan, scheduled to be completed by June of 1992.
40 Interview with Mickey Brunswick
41 Common Ground Application to Campaign for Human Development, prepared
by Lead Organizer Brunswick, James A.; Chester, PA; 1991
With regard to the CRA's approach to citizen participation, however, one
caveat should be mentioned. Because of their experience of getting plans
blocked, the essential objective of community participation by Chester
planners is to get the plans implemented. For this reason broad based
participation will probably not be aggressively pursued. When asked how
the City Planning Committee intended to insure that the maximum number of
citizens were recruited for the process Theresa Heintz' response was
cynical. "Those people that care will show up".
When asked if COP would play a role in the city's advisory process,
Brunswick stressed that before issues are put on the table with the city,
leadership skills must be developed and a system of accountability must be
set up. COP's initial strategy also has an 18 month time line. During
this period, congregants will be interviewed regarding what their concerns
are. At the end of the 18 month period, a conference is planned. At that
time representatives will discuss and document their vision for the city.
When I asked Brunswick if his coalition would protest aspects of the plans
that were not in the community's best interests, he thought that unless
there was some highly offensive issue, COP would be too busy setting up
its own agenda for revitalization. It will be interesting to see what
reactions COP will have to the city's community participation process at
the end of the 18 month period.
It seems that community participation in Chester may be moving into a new
age. Members of the Chester Organizing Project will not be satisfied with
fancy reports and impressive community development agenda as their
predecessors have been. If COP realizes its goals of developing leaders
that are accountable to the community and building an extensive grass
roots constituency, the coalition will have the power to affect true
reform in Chester city government, getting it one step closer to breaking
the impasse in economic development.
WHAT IS REALLY GOING ON HERE?
Locally based development in the city of Chester is at an impasse. We
have learned in this chapter that key players disagree why this is so.
Community activists blame the lack of cooperation and accountability
within the city government. Regional funders cite the lack of expertise
of community groups. The county believes Chester should look outside the
box. The city blames the county for "treating it like a stepchild".
Many blame factors that are internal to Chester.
The impasse, in fact, reflects three levels of conflict between the
interests of the community, city, and county. The broadest level of
conflict is that of local versus county control over development. The
county believes that Chester should think of itself in the larger context
of economic development in the county and in the region, whereas the city
believes that the county should include it as an equal partner in economic
development and not treat Chester like a stepchild. In the case of
Chester, making the argument of local versus county control is complicated
by the corruption emanating from the Republican party. By perpetuating
Chester's negative image, the county paper aids in serving the county's
interest in controlling Chester's development. By perpetuating a negative
image, funders who might be potential resource for locally controlled
development are cautious. This allows Chester's development to remain in
a state of inertia while the county gains a greater foothold along the
proposed Route and along the waterfront.
Secondly, there is the conflict between public officials and the community
over the official's lack of accountability. With regards to industrial
development the city has pursued a strategy of industrial development
which includes the expansion of Route 291. Activists and local citizens
believe an economic development strategy focused on heavy industry is not
necessarily in the interests of the people and businesses currently
located along the waterfront. However, in the past the city has sided with
the county against the wishes of the community. Furthermore, their
current efforts towards community participation are largely motivated by
a desire to get plans implemented without opposition from the community.
Therefore, underlying the current policy orientation toward community
involvement, there is still a conflict of interests and a potential for
continuing impasse.
The third source of impasse is the fragmentation of community-based
efforts. Community-based groups and church leaders lack solidarity and
community-based planners efforts have been isolated and in some cases
community-based groups are duplicating efforts. Fragmentation has made
the community vulnerable to interference from the city, as was the case in
the Common Ground coalition, and fragmentation contributes to planners not
thinking outside the box.
Given that there are underlying conflicts which contribute to Chester's
impasse, an analysis and perscription that deals with the imbalance of
power between the community and city versus the county is neccesary. This
takes us beyond the consensual limits of Gittell's list of factors and
places the Chester experience closer, in spirit, to the work of King. In
Chapter Four I will review my analysis in light of the Gittell and King
theory. Chapter four will also draw on key player's perceptions and
current projects to make suggestions on how to move Chester beyond the
impasse.
CHAPTER FOUR
REVIEW, ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS, RECuMnIaTIONS
Chapter Four contains a review of the findings, analysis and suggestions
for future action in changing the direction of Chester's economic
development. The first section, What Have We Learned? recaps the major
findings in light of the theory explored in Chapter One. A State of
Impasse clarifies some of the contradictions and fills out the incomplete
views of interviewees in Chapter Three. Finally, Where Does Chester Go
From Here? draws on the first two sections and makes broad-based
recommendations for reversing decline in the city.
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?
In Chapters Two and Three, we drew upon the work of Ross Gittell and Mel
King as a means of understanding the apparent contradictions of people's
actions and viewpoints with regard to the revitalization of Chester,
Pennsylvania.
Gittell's analysis focuses on filling certain roles and functions. These
roles, when filled, serve as synergistic components which reverse the
state of inertia in the economic revitalization of a mid-sized city. The
Gittell's factors are static and they assume a propensity for consensus
among all vested interests. However, in the case of a community where
vested interests from outside the community threatened to retard or
inhibit the development of that community for the benefit of the people,
a more confrontational and developmental model is needed. Mel King's
stage development theory provides that model.
King stresses the developmental aspect of revitalization, with organizing
and indigenous institution building playing a key role. Organizing not
only changes the community' s psychology, but it unites the community and
gives it more power to confront the precarious interests of outsiders.
King's developmental model requires a sense of momentum and continuity in
order to see that a community progresses from one stage to the next.
King's stage theory implies this sense of momentum and continuity but it
is not explicit.
The social movement concept's sense of momentum and a sense of continuity
place a premium on local activists and planners understanding of history
and strategic planning. A knowledge of history (which is more expanded
than Gittell's requirement which only cover those socio-political factors
that effect a community's economic development history and the community's
receptiveness to future revitalization efforts) that includes a historical
analysis of leadership structure is neccessary so that actors and planners
can learn from their mistakes. Strategic planning is neccesary so that
individual projects, protests, and plans move the community forward
towards reaching its self-defined vision. I have also added to the
Gittell and King literature an understanding of the conflicts between
major stakeholders.
The significance of the social movement concept in the case of Chester is
that it implies that a community vision must serve as more than the
rallying point or consensus building mechanism that Gittell suggests. The
vision is a goal or set of goals toward which the community coordinates
planning, institution building, and grass-roots organizing. With a sense
of continuity that a social movement provides, efforts can be evaluated,
new agendas set and actions taken with the idea that all of the former are
directed towards materializing the vision.
This notion of a social movement stands in contrast to the action/reaction
planning that has characterized Chester's community-based efforts in the
past. The initial reaction never moved beyond the initial plan or the
initial project. The East Side Caucus and the Chester Regeneration
Project had the seeds of a social movement in that one of their goals was
to minimize their dependency on outside institutions for their survival.
However, in the process of carrying out these projects, that goal was lost
in all the technical complexities of research or in building an
organization.
How well do my findings about Chester fit with these three theories? I
organize this review of the findings within Gittell's categories since
many of them are important to the revitalization of Chester in the minds
of key players. However, within each catagory, Gittell's framework leaves
much unexplained or unexamined, so I supplemented his theory with King's
insights, and with my own.
History
As Gittell suggests, historical precedent plays an important role in
shaping the community's psychology or perceptions. The perceptions of key
players external to the city of Chester also play an important role.
History shapes a community's leadership structure, in particular the
leadership structure in Chester's black community. We pushed beyond the
Gittell theory and looked at how white flight and political manipulation
have determined an imbalance of power between the county' s Republican
machine and local Chesterites. Gittell requires only that we look at the
history of economic development projects to determine the communities
receptivity to new development ventures.
We also compared Chester's political and community development with that
of King's stage theory of community development. What we discovered is
that in Chester's experiences with the East Side Caucus, the Chester
Regeneration Project, and Common Ground, activists and planners had
virtually skipped the organizing stage in their quest to create new
institutions of economic development. It is the opinion of the author
that because Chester activists lost several opportunities to develop a
history of community struggle and social change, their many efforts did
not constitute a social movement. Building a social movement requires
planning. Strategic planning forces activists to understand the larger
forces at work. In addition to the lack of stategic planning, the lack of
a social movement made it difficult for activists and community-based
planners to confront, reevaluate and move forward in a consorted effort to
interact with those larger forces. In fact, what we witnessed in Chester
was reactive planning and protest to the forces of the county and city
government.
Vision
In the tradition of Gittell, we also tried to understand the role of an
inclusive community vision. According to Gittell, an inclusive vision has
the potential for changing community perceptions and getting people to
work cooperatively towards the community's revitalization. What we
learned in Chapter Three is that such a vision did not exist. Visions
were heavily influenced by vested political interests. Community-based
planners' visions, though fragmented, are in conflict with that of the
city's vision of industrial development near the waterfront. At varying
points in history, the city's vision was in conflict with the county's
vision of the city as an economic resource that should contribute first
and foremost to the growth of the county and the region.
Leadership
As was the case with community vision, we found that Chester lacked the
kind of leadership that Gittell says is necessary to orchestrate and
promote revitalization. Through understanding Chester's history -- with
the help of Squarrel-Jenkins and by examining the imbalance of power
between city and county, as well as the lack of an organized, grass-roots
power-base -- we understand why the current vacuum exists. Economic
decline left very limited opportunities for local leadership in the
economic sphere, particularly among black Chesterites.
Leadership from the local political officials is impossible under current
conditions because they are not accountable to the citizenry. The party
machine to which local officials belong left a legacy of corruption and is
still believed to control city politics from behind the scenes.
Additionally, local political leadership is not respected by the county.
The fate of the traditional leadership and activists also help to explain
the lack of a social movement in Chester. Traditional leadership, which
had its base in the black community, lost much of this influence during
the Civil Rights Era but traditional leaders -- now represented by church
leaders -- remain the most trusted leaders in the community. Activists
have traditionally been viewed as trouble-makers, not as catalysts for
positive change. Activists and churched based leaders have experienced
difficulty in working together. However, this may change with the new
strategies of the Chester Organizing Project.
Competent Local Development Agencies
The existence of at least one competent local development agency is
another Gittell criteria for success in community revitalization. In
Chester we found that the one active development agency, the Chester
Redevelopment Authority, has been too susceptible to political influence
to play the role as central development agency in Chester. Susan Clarke
(1987), has suggested that although local institutions are constrained by:
limited expertise, jurisdiction, the free floating nature of private
capital, and fragmentation in local political structures; an agency's
autonomy is directly linked to its propensity to engage in policies that
are contrary to the interests of business (and possibly other strong
political forces]. It follows from Clarke that the CRA is not likely to
pursue policies in the best interests of the people when they are in
conflict with the goals of local government and because of the city's
current political orientation, it is unlikely to go against the interests
of business. Furthermore, because of the fragmentation that has existed
among community-based efforts, there is currently no logical center of
gravity among community-based organizations from which a competent agency
might be groomed.
Gittell would have us believe that a competent local development agency
would go a long way towards solving the problem. However, as the Mon
Valley Case illustrates, the power imbalance between localities and the
county makes what a local group is able to accomplish uncertain. In
Chester, the county maintains the power imbalance by isolating the local
government. It says the city should be more a part of county development,
yet as was the case in the trash to steam plant, county officials use the
county paper as a sounding board to perpetuate an image that undermines
Chester's ability to promote itself to outside funders and investors.
A STATE OF IMPASSE
Locally based development in the city of Chester is at an impasse. We
have learned from Chapter Three that key players disagree why this is so.
What the impasse really reflects are three levels of conflict between the
interests of the community, city, and county. The impasse has been aided
by the inability of Chester planners and activists to "think outside the
box".
Coummnity/City vs. County Conflicts
In dealing with city/county conflicts there are two choices. 1)
Negotiation or convening of the two interests or 2) a change in the
balance of power between the two. Gittell's notion of finding some system
of convening the interests of various groups seems unlikely in the short
term given the imbalance of power and the past conflicts between the city
and county. The county, in the more powerful position does not see the
need to negotiate or accommodate the needs of Chester. Furthermore, the
conflicts of interest between the city and county and the even more
fundamental conflicts between the interests of the county and the interest
of the people of Chester makes cooperation difficult. The vast political
and socio-economic differences between Chesterites and the county machine
leads me to believe that the county will never put the city's interests
first. Therefore, it is necessary that there is a change in political
leadership and new community-based institutions must be developed. Both
will require getting past negative community perceptions. This is where
grassroots organizing can play a key role.
The result of the county's actions on the local government is that the
citizenry withdraws its support from local government or it is in constant
battle with the city. Therefore in order for Chester to have development
that is responsive to the needs of its poverty-stricken citizenry, the
community must gain more power. With power, they can change the system of
accountability with local government and can subsequently be a stronger
voice in the county.
Activists must recognize that tangible benefits must be given up in the
short run in order to organize the community. Stage community development
theory tells us that there are certain tradeoffs in following this
strategy. The tangible benefits of economic development must take a back
seat to gaining power and changing community psychology through grass-
roots organizing. Stage community development theory teaches us that
physical or tangible development should come only after there is local
control of development decisions. This requires that activists change the
manner in which they respond to development pressure. COP's Lead
Organizer realizes this when he says that the coalition will not be able
to participate in the city's community participation committee. Instead
of simply reacting to outside forces, the opposition should become the
starting point for developing a social movement. A social movement that
is in part a reform movement, part increasing community participation, and
part local control over development decisions would enable Chester to
change the current path of economic and civic decline.
Comnmity vs. City Conflicts
Gittell (1990) and others (Felbinger 1980) allude to the need for a
cooperative city government for successful community-based development.
However, because local public officials are not accountable to the
community, and have engaged in development projects without consulting the
community, there have been several conflicts between city government and
community-based planners. The confrontation between the Common Ground
coalition and the mayor is the most dramatic example of this conflict.
Constant battles with local government take away time, energy and focus
from the business of revitalizing the community. Here we can see the
necessity for a social movement that forces activists and planners to look
at the big picture, strategize and plan ---- to a take a long range view
of development. Taking such actions gives the community more power in
dealing with the city and the county.
Fragmentation Within the Comunity
Community planners are often overwhelmed with Chester's expanse of social
problems. Mayor Leake's actions of splitting up the community is an
example of the city's ability to interfere with an unorganized, and
therefore fragile coalition. The historical division between traditional
leaders and activists make unity in the community difficult. These things
lead to fragmentation at the community-based level. The fragmentation in
community-based efforts does not allow community-based leadership to see
how their efforts fit into a larger picture. They are not able to see the
larger picture chiefly because they have not developed a vision which
community-based leadership can agree upon.
Creating a broader vision forces the community to look beyond their
immediate goals and needs. When Chester planners realize that their goals
can only be solved, in the long run, by dealing with the larger forces
they will not only have to think outside the box but develop strategies
for interacting with the world outside of the box.
Lack of Capacity
Local Chester planners failed to increase the technical capacity of local
residents in the East Side Caucus and the Chester Regeneration Project.
City agencies never had the opportunity to increase their capacity in the
Riverbridge Project or the trash to steam plant. The agencies may have
lost the opportunity in part by thier own incompetence -- but when the
county took over, they deprived the city of the chance to build its
competence.
Gittell's assertion that communities need to have a competent local
development agency is nothing if not obvious. Chester planners must
address this lack of local capacity by creating a local agency which is
not only technically competent, but autonomous from political influence,
and one that promotes the true spirit of participatory planning.
Self-Sufficiency Ideology
In chapters Two and Three we discussed the history of community-based
planning in Chester. In those chapters we found that many community-based
efforts began as a response to outside forces. The natural inclination,
then, was to remove the influence of outside forces on the community's
economy. Hence came the birth of a development ideology based on self-
sufficiency.
While self-sufficiency in itself is a noble goal, it is a somewhat more
naive goal than local control over the development process. Given the
complexities in modern society and economies, it is unlikely that any city
can be economically self-sufficient. Local control, while not an easy
goal to obtain, requires control over development decisions, something
that happens often in wealthy communities although seldom in poor ones.
The self-sufficiency ideology in Chester allowed activists and planners to
turn their back on outside forces rather than confront the realities and
limitations of dealing with the imbalance of power between them, the city,
and the county.
WHERE DOES CHESTER GO FROM HERE?
In order to change the current path of Chester's economy destiny ,
Chesterites must address the lack of civic pride and community
participation, build a new structure of accountability and develop
accountable leaders. It must reform city government, and develop
alternative institutions that will foster these goals.
Address Apathy and C'munity Participation Through Grassroots Organizing
Chester activists have realized that change will only come about though
grass roots organization. The ultimate success of activist efforts will
depend upon the degree to which grassroots organizing is seen as part of
a social movent that combines organizing with government reform,
increasing sense of civic duty through participation in all aspects of
revitalization, building community power, and local control over
development.
Reform/Accountability
Interviewees noted that in the long run Chester's local government must
change. We can learn from the experiences of other cities that political
reform and community struggle can have impacts that are long lasting and
far reaching. The experiences of Chicago during the Washington
administration show us that reform politics can be combined with
progressive economic development policy to provide an inspirational mode
of governing. The Chicago experience also shows us without developing a
deep cadre of leaders fragile coalitions can be lost.
In Boston's Roxbury community, successive struggles "[left behind] more
developed leadership, consciousness, organizations, and institutions.".
The Roxbury experience has made a permanent impact on the politics and
development policy of the city of Boston.
"Boston's Black Political Task Force has become powerful
enough that its endorsement is sought by white candidates as
well as Black." (Kennedy, Tilly, and Gaston 1990)
This has allowed blacks to gain political offices at the local and state
level.
Based on the long-term legacy of struggle, Roxbury's community control
movement has made an unprecedented accomplishment. A local community
group, the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative has gained control over
their communities development by gaining the right of eminent domain over
the Dudley Neighborhood in Roxbury. We should not mistake the Roxbury
model as the panacea for community development. Roxbury has, by no means
solved all of its problems of poverty, deterioration, and its weak
position in Boston politics. However, the gains made by Roxbury residents
are an important step in this community's development.
The struggles in Boston and Chicago have had impact on the political and
community revitalization policy on a national scale. Harold Washington's
success inspired the presidential campaign of Jesse Jackson. "Other
struggles (in Boston] over the years, especially around tenant, education,
and welfare issues have linked Roxbury groups, not only within the city,
but also with national networks." (Kennedy, Tilly, and Gaston 1990)
Develop New Institutions When the Time is Right
Given that there is currently no local institution that is currently
capable of becoming the central economic development agency, the
development of new institutions must come over time --- after extensive
community organizing. Without a complete restructuring of CRA to make it
a more autonomous organization or the creation of a new economic
development agency, progress in economic development will be retarded
without reform in local government.
The option of creating a new organization in the very near future is
unlikely given past disappointments. Foundations and other funders,
though friendly, are not likely to have a great deal of confidence in a
new effort. Additionally, it will take a herculean effort to get past the
inward looking psychology of local planners in the short run.
There are two strategies for creating hope and a sense of accomplishment
among Chesterites. The Chester Organizing Project and RDC, Inc are both
in a stage of evaluation and defining/redefining their efforts. If the
COP can expand its goals to cover both political accountability and
accountability over CDBG funding and play a policy setting role in
economic development it could accomplish a great deal. Building a strong
grass roots organization can regain the confidence of funders, spin off
new organizations, provide a policy/political touchstone for current
community-based efforts, in addition to building a base of grassroots
support for development efforts.
RDC has experience, technical capacity, and the respect of county
development agencies, and through Bill Payne, the trust of community-based
developers. If their role during this current planning process can be
expanded to training of citizen groups to work cooperatively with planners
and teach citizens to effectively evaluate plans, the stage can be set for
institutionalization of effective community participation in the planning
process. Cooperative efforts with leadership training in COP efforts
should also be explored.
Given the foundations' concern regarding fragmentation among community-
based efforts, they can encourage a coordinated approach to community
development by requiring a clear connection or complementarity to other
efforts. In order to address some of the mistakes made in the past
regarding participation, progress can be evaluated not only in terms of
completed projects but increased community participation, skills learned
by staff, board, and the constituency of these organizations. In fact, in
the initial stages the latter measures of progress should be the more
important considerations.
Changing the direction of Chester's decline will take a great deal of
cooperation and orchestration between Chesterites, regional funders, and
all institutions that are concerned with development by and for the people
of Chester. It is an effort that will also take patience. It took 50
years for Chester to reach its current state. The decline cannot be
reversed in one or even 5 years. However, with a new understanding of
what has brought Chester to its current state, and of the obvious and the
less visible forces at work that allow the city to continue to decline,
activists, concerned citizens, and planners can move Chester beyond the
state of impasse.
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